1. This appeal arises out of a suit under Section 77 of the Registration act for registration of a mortgage bond for Rs. 1,000, said to have been executed by two ladies : one of them admitted execution and the document was registered so far as she was concerned, the other denied and the Sub-Registrar refused registration on the 4th August 1914. On appeal the District Registrar refused registration en the 9th November 1914. This suit was filed on the 8th December 1914 before the Munsif, being then valued at Rs. 500, On the 16th September 1915, the Munsif held that it had not been properly valued. The plaint was then amended and 'for the purposes of jurisdiction of the Court ' the suit was valued at Rs. 1,100. The Munsif then held that it exceeded the limit of his jurisdiction and he returned the plaint on the 14th December 1915. It was then presented before the Subordinate Judge on the 16th December 1915, who dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by-limitation. The District Judge also took the same view on appeal, both of them basing their judgment on the case of Abdul Hakim v. Latifunnessa Khatun 30 C. 532 : 7 C.W.N. 560. hence this appeal. The appellant contends that the case of Khetter Mohun Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha 10 C. 265 is direct authority that Section 14 of the Limitation act applies and that the plaintiff is entitled to deduct the period during which he was prosecuting in good faith this suit in the Munsif's Court, which that Court could not entertain from defect of jurisdiction. In Abdul Hakim v. Laltifunnessa 30 C. 532 : 7 C.W.N. 560 the learned Judges held that they were not prepared to follow Khetter Mohun Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha 10 C. 265 specially having regard to the Full Bench case of Nagendro Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi 18 C. 368 (F.B.) which had been followed by the Madras Full Bench in the case of Veeramma v. Abbiah 18 M. 99 (F.B.). Even before Abdul Hakim v. Latifunnessa 30 C. 532 : 7 C.W.N. 560 this Court did not take the same view as was taken in Khetter Mohun Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha 10 C. 265 in Giriia Nath v. Patani Bibee 17 C. 263. This matter is governed by Section 29(1)(b) of the Limitation act, which says that nothing in that act shall affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India. This clause corresponds to Section 6 of Act XV of 1877, Section 6 of act, IX of 1871 and Section 3 of act XIV of 1859. By Section 77 of the Registration act the period of 30 days is specially prescribed for such suits. Part 12 of the Registration Act specially deals with the procedure when registration is refused. Section 71 deals with the manner in which the reasons for refusal are to be recorded : it provides that a copy of the reasons so recorded shall be supplied without payment and unnecessary delay.
2. Section 72 relates to an appeal to the Registrar from the order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to register on grounds other than denial of execution. Section 73 deals with applications to the Registrar where the Sub Registrar refuses to register on the ground of denial of execution. Section 74 relates to the procedure to be adopted by the Registrar on such applications and directs that he shall, as soon as conveniently may be, enquire into the matter. Section 75 deals with the order made by the Registrar and the procedure thereon. Section 76 provides that a copy of the order for refusal is to be supplied without unnecessary delay to the applicant. Section 77 empowers the institution of a suit within 30 days after the date of refusal. These sections contain a complete procedure when registration is refused and Section 77 limits the period to thirty days. The prevailing idea is that there should be expedition and no unnecessary delay. It is with that object that a special rule of limitation was laid down under Section 77 and the question is, having regard to such a provision, whether the period can be extended under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In Khetter Mohun Chuokerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha 10 C. 265 the learned Judges relied upon Golap Chand Nowluckha v. Krishto Chunder Dass 5 C. 314 holding that the principle of that case was directly applicable to the case before them, but that case was practically overruled in Nagendro Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi 18 C. 368 (F.B.). The Fall Bench relied upon Poulson v. Modhoosoodun Paul Chowdhry B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 101 : 2 W.R. Act X Rul. 21 and the Privy Council case of Unnoda Persaud Mokerjee v. Kristo Coomar Moitro 15 B.L.R. 60 note (P.C.) : 19 W.R. 5. In Giriii Nath Roy v. Patani Bibi 17 C. 263 the learned Judges had practically taken the same view. In Veeramma v. Abbiah 18 M. 99 (F.B.) the Full Bench accepted the view of the Calcutta Full Bench in Nagendro Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi 18 C. 368 (F.B.). Justice Muthusami Aiyar was of opinion that it would be incongruous to impart into the Registration act the general provisions of the Limitation Act and that indefinite extension was likely to defeat the object of registration and that the Registration Act with regard to this matter wag complete in itself. We are of opinion that the principle laid down in the case of Nagendro Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi 18 C. 368 (F.B.) governs the question before us and we feel bound to follow it. Dropadi v. Hira Lal 16 Ind. Cas. 149 : 34 A. 496 : 10 A.L.J. 373 relates to the Insolvenoy Act. The Allahabad Court held it was not a complete code in itself. We think that the question of limitation in this case has been rightly decided by both the Courts and this appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.