S.K. Ghose, J.
1. This Rule is directed against an order in a Small Cause Court matter passed by the Munsif of Ranaghat and it arises out of the following circumstances: The petitioner Ram Krishna Sen Gupta took a loan from the opposite party Haripur Cooperative Bank. His case is that the loan was for a sum of Rs. 180 and that the Secretary of the Bank fraudulently entered the amount as Rs. 250 on the bond. According to the petitioner the entire debt of Rs. 180 was satisfied by various payments ending on March 24, 1930. But three years after this date a further sum of Rs. 155-7-6 was demanded by the Bank on the ground that the bond was for the sum of Rs. 250. Thereupon under Rule 21 framed by the Government of Bengal under Section 43 of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act the matter was referred to the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies who again referred it to the arbitration of an Inspector of the Co-operative Societies. On May 26, 1933, the said arbitrators gave an award in favour of the Bank. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Registrar but it was dismissed. Thereafter on April 17, 1934, the award was put into execution in the Small Cause Court at Eanaghat under Rule 22(7). The petitioner preferred an objection on various grounds, but the learned Munsif by his order, dated June 6, 1931, overruled the objection. Against the order the present Rule has been obtained.
2. The first point taken in support of the Rule is that the reference to arbitration is ultra vires because the dispute is stated to be between a past member, as the petitioner undoubtedly was, and the Society itself whereas under Rule 22(1) 'any dispute touching the business of a Registered Society between a past member' and 'the committee or any officer shall be referred in writing to the Registrar'. It is contended that the Society itself is not equivalent to the Committee or an officer. According to the definition of 'committee as given in Clause (C), Section 2 of the Act it means the the governing body of the Society to whom the management of its affiairs is entrusted. In this case the dispute must have been between the petitioner and the committee, and the use of the name of the Bank appearing in the proceedings is a purely formal matter which does not affect the nature of the dispute on the ground of jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that no such objection was taken in the arbitration proceedings, although the petitioner preferred an appeal against the decision of the arbitrator. The point, therefore, has no substance.
3. The next point urged is that the application for execution is barred under Article 178 of the Limitation Act because it was filed on May 17, 1934, while the award was made on May 26, 1933. But Article 178 has no application because the award was not filed under Section 20 of the second schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of obtaining a decree thereon, the award in this case having itself the force of a decree; see Sub-rule (7) of Rule 22. It is further contended that under Sub-rule (7) the application should be to any Civil Court having local jurisdiction and that this description applies to Civil Courts having ordinary jurisdiction and not Small Cause Court jurisdiction. This argument has also no force, because if the suit had been filed to enforce the claim, it would have to fee filed before the Small Cause Court at Ranaghat. The Rule cannot, therefore, stand on this point also.
4. The result is that the Rule must be discharged. There will be no order as to costs.