1. These two appeals arise from an order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Dinajpur in the following circumstances. The decree-holder-respondent obtained a decree and put it into execution. The property against which he proceeded consisted of 24 lots, and the sale began on the 16th February, 1921. On the application of the judgment-debtor, the Court ordered that the sale would be continued until the 18th February, 1921. On the 18th the Judge made this order: 'The bid will be accepted on 30th March, 1921, on return from Jalpaiguri as prayed for by the judgment-debtor in to-day's petition. Decree-holder also consented.' The Judge return-ad from Jalpaiguri on the 30th March and made this order: 'There is no reason for allowing further time to the judgment-debtor, direct that the sale be concluded and the parties concerned be directed to deposit the sums due for price by tomorrow.' On the following day, his order was: 'the bids may be accepted and the sales concluded. Absent bidders be served with notices that their bids have been accepted and others be informed of the acceptance of bid'. The Nazir on the same day reported that Tularam Bhuturia (appellant in appeal No. 177) had retracted his offer in respect of 5 lots before the bid was knocked down and that Satish Chandra Das, bidder in respect of 3 lots, Baidya Nath Das and Kissori Mohan Das, bidders for 2 lots, and Basant Kumar Guha, bidder for one lot, were absent. The last four persons are the appellants in appeal No. 287. Therefore at the instance of the decree-holder, the Court proceeded to sell these lots afresh. The bids in the second Hale were considerably lower and, at the instance of the decree holder the Court issued notices on the defaulting bidders to pay the differences. They objected and the judgment against which these appeals are preferred is the judgment disposing of their objections.
2. So far as Tularam is concerned, very little need be said. As I have mentioned, the Nazir reported on the 31st March, 1921, that Tularam retracted his offer before the bid was knocked down. On the authorities it is clear that Tularam had the right to withdraw his bid. It is urged however, for the respondent that his bid had actually been accepted before it was withdrawn. For that view, I can find no support. The Nazir was the officer conducting the sale and his report is quite clear that the withdrawal was made before the hammer fell. Consequently, Tularam's appeal must be allowed and the Judge's order reversed so far as he is concerned.
3. With regard to the others, they were absent on the 31st March. The first point In their favour is this that they were not consulted about the adjournment of the sale from the 18th February to the 30th March. It is suggested that they probably knew and did not object. But that is not enough. There is nothing on the record to show that they gave their consent. That being so, the position is that these men who bid for the various lots expecting that the auction-sale would be concluded with reasonable expedition either the very day on which the offer was made or at any rate the following day, found to their surprise six weeks later that the sale was not concluded on the day the offer was made but that it was kept open for this abnormal length of time. It appears to me that the reasonable view is that each of these bidders made his offer on the condition that it would be accepted or rejected within the period during which such sales ordinarily last, and that in the absence of anything to show that he consented to the period being protracted to the extraordinary length of six weeks, we ought to hold that his offer was not intended by him to be open, for that unusual length of six weeks, I think, therefore, that the appeal of Satis Chandra Das and others should also be allowed on this ground.
4. The result is that the judgment of the lower Court is reversed and the order directing the appellants in both these appeals to pay the decree-holder the deficits on sums by which their offers exceeded the amount realised at the second sale is set aside with costs in both Courts, the hearing fee in each of these appeals being assessed at two gold mohurs.
5. I agree.