1. Though the officiating Manaif has obviously bestowed considerable labour upon hip judgment the result has beets by no means satisfactory, because he has delivered a judgment which has reason ably led to an application for this Rule. The suit is one under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and the points for determination were formulated by the learned Judge at, the outset of his judgment. Amongst those points was this, 'whether the, plaintiffs were in possession of the land in suit within six months from the date of dispossession.' That is not one of the points requisite for the purposes of a suit under Section 9. All that has to be determined for the purposes of that Section is whether the plaintiff was dispossessed, and whether his suit was brought within a six months' time from when the dispossession occurred, in other words, regard is to be had to the terms of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and Article 3 of the second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. The judgment, undoubtedly, has scattered, throughout it, phrases which would appear to indicate that the Judge thought that there had been a dispossession, and if those phrases stood alone, then the plaintiff would have been entitled to the relief he seeks by means of this application. But there are other parts of the judgment which have to be taken into consideration, and those other parts make it clear to my mind that the expression used by the learned Judge as to dispossession was hypothetical; in the sense that he said that if there was dispossession then it was in the month of February. But he goes on to make it clear that in his opinion there was no dispossession because there was no possession by the plaintiff; and in this view of the judgment, it appears to me that we ought not to interfere in revision. We must accordingly discharge the Rule, but as the plaintiff has been misled by the judgment of the Court we make no orders as to costs.