1. This is an appeal from an order made by the lower Court on an application in an execution-case. The only point we have to consider is whether the execution proceedings were barred by limitation. An application for execution in respect of a certain debt was made on the 9fch September 1905. The next application that was made was on the 27th April 1909. The question is whether this second application was barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The point before us is whether an application of insolvency which was made on the 14th May 1909 contained such an acknowledgment of the liability as to bring the case under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The judgment-debtor filed a petition of insolvency in which he set out, in compliance with the statute, a list of his debts. The debt which forms the subject-matter of the execution proceedings was mentioned in that petition. Under the last part of explanation (1) to Section 19 it is not necessary that the acknowledgment under the Section should be addressed to the person entitled to the property in respect of which the acknowledgment is made, This seems to prevent (he only argument that can be raised under the section, namely, that the acknowledgment was not made to the creditors. Whether it was in fact made to the creditors or not we need not consider, for the terms of the Section amply cover the statement in the insolvency proceedings. Such authority as is quoted in the matter seems to rest on English cases which we need not consider here, as we have to consider the terms of the Indian Limitation Act. This construction of Section 19 seems to be referred to in the case of Moni Ram Seth v. Seth Rupckand 33 C. 1047 at P. 1058 : 4 C.L.J. 94 : 8 Bom. L.R. 501 : 10 C.W.N. 874 : J.M.L.T. 199 : 3 A.L.J 625 : 16 M.L.J. 300 : 2 N.L.R. 130 decided by the Privy Council. We hold, therefore, that the lower Court is right in deciding that the second petition for execution of the decree was not barred, as the petition of insolvency contained a sufficient acknowledgment to keep alive the decrees.
2. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
3. This judgment governs Appeal from Original Order No. 446 of 1909. In each of these appeals the hearing fee is assessed at one gold mohur.