1. The main question involved in this appeal is whether the suit out of which this appeal arises is barred by the special limitation under Article 3, Schedule III, of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been dispossessed in Pons 1323 of their raiyati land by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, at the instigation of the Raja, the defendant No. 3, and with the help of defendants Nos. 4 to 7. The suit has been decreed by the Courts below, overruling the objection that the suit was barred. The lower Appellate Court held that the special law of limitation had no application to the case, as the dispossession was by defendant No. 1 after the settlement by the Raja and after the execution of the kabuliyat in favour of the Raja. It is found, however, that the dispossession took place in 1317, and not in 1323 as alleged in the plaint.
2. As stated above, the plaintiffs come to Court on the allegation that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 with the assistance of the defendants Nos. 4 to 7, who have been found to be the burkundazes of the Raja, and instigated by the Raja (defendant No. 3), forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed the plaintiffs from the land.
3. There is no doubt that where a person has been dispossessed by another who subsequently takes settlement from, or is recognized as tenant by, the landlord, and the landlord has had no band in the ouster, such dispossession does not amount to dispossession by the landlord, and in such a case the plaintiff will not be barred by Article 3 of Schedule III, See Ramijulla v. Ishab Dhali 6 C.W.N. 702 : 29 C. 610 (F.B.), nor in a case where the landlord simply favoured the dispossession by a third party See Basanta Kumari v. Nanda Ram 20 Ind. Cas. 350 : 17 C.W.N. 1149 : 18 C.L.J. 86. In the case of Kedar Nath Mondal v. Mohesh Chandra Khan 46 Ind. Cas. 787 : 28 C.L.J. 216 the learned Judges were inclined to hold, on the authority of the above case, that the Artiste does not apply where the dispossession was by a person under an authority from the landlord. And where the landlord himself bad no hand in the ouster and some person on his behalf, without having any authority to do so, gives an amalnamah to a person who dispossesses the raiyat, it has been held that the case does not come under Article 3. See Sheikh Eradut v. Daloo Sheikh 1 C.W.N. 573.
4. The doctrine of constructive dispossession should not be extended, as was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J, in Basanta Kumari v. Nanda Ram 20 Ind. Cas. 350 : 17 C.W.N. 1149 : 18 C.L.J. 86 and Rudra Narain Maity v. Natabar Jana 21 Ind. Cas. 431 : 18 C.W.N. 353 : 41 C. 52 : 18 C.L.J. 89 and as was pointed out by him in the case of Krishna Chandra Bagdi v. Satish Chandra Banerjee 35 Ind. Cas. 365 : 20 C.W.N. 872 that in determining what Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act means, the purpose and the scope of the Act, which governs the relation of landlord and tenant only, must not be left out of sight, and that it was not the design of the Act to deprive a tenant of the rights that he otherwise possesses against a third person between whom and himself there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and that it was only intended to deal with such rights as existed between landlord and tenant, The learned Pleader for the respondent relied upon this ease, and also the other cases mentioned above. But in the present ease the Raja, the landlord, granted a settlement to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who were his peons, and the dispossession was effected by them with the help of the Raja's barkundazes (defendants Nos. 4 to 7), and at the instigation of the Raja, the principal defendant No. 3, all of them acting in concert. We think, under the circumstances, that it is a ease which comes under Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. That being so, it is not necessary to consider the other points raised in the case.
5. The decrees of the Court below will be set aside and the plaintiffs' suit will be dismissed with costs in all Courts.