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Sudananda Moral and ors. Vs. Rakhal Sana and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Reported inAIR1927Cal920
AppellantSudananda Moral and ors.
RespondentRakhal Sana and ors.
Cases ReferredSee Kanai Lal v. Jatindar Nath
Excerpt:
- .....of the munsif of khulna, dated the 11th august 1926, rejecting an application under order 47, rule 1, civil p.c. for review of a contested judgment should not be set aside. it appears that the judgment in the suit which was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant for declaration of title to and recovery of khas possession of land as also for mesne profits was based on ex. 1, which was a judgment of the additional district -judge of khulna which held that the plaintiff had no subsisting title to the disputed land. that judgment has to some extent been set aside by a decision of the high court in the case of sadananda mandal v. kumar jyotish kanta a.i.r. 1926 cal. 952. it has been argued by mr. sen that as the judgment on which reliance was placed by the munsif has been set.....
Judgment:

Mitter, J.

1. This rule was issued on the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Munsif of Khulna, dated the 11th August 1926, rejecting an application under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C. for review of a contested judgment should not be set aside. It appears that the judgment in the suit which was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendant for declaration of title to and recovery of khas possession of land as also for mesne profits was based on Ex. 1, which was a judgment of the Additional District -Judge of Khulna which held that the plaintiff had no subsisting title to the disputed land. That judgment has to some extent been set aside by a decision of the High Court in the case of Sadananda Mandal v. Kumar Jyotish Kanta A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 952. It has been argued by Mr. Sen that as the judgment on which reliance was placed by the Munsif has been set aside by the High Court, a good ground has been made out for review of judgment. Mr. Sen has argued forcibly that even if a case for review has not been made out, the Court should interfere under its inherent power under Section 151, Civil P.C. I am not satisfied that the mere reversal of the judgment (Ex. 1) which was put in as a piece of evidence in the suit that reversal having taken place subsequent to the decision of that suit is a ground for review. As was observed by the Judicial Committee in the case of Kotaghiri Venkata v. Velanki Venkata [1900] 24 Mad. 1 a ground for review must, at any rate, be something which existed at the time of the decree and the section does not authorise review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of some subsequent event. There can' be no1 question that when the Munsif delivered his judgment on 11th December 1925 the High Court decision reversing the decision of the Additional District Judge of Khulna (Ex. 1) had not been passed; consequently the case clearly falls within the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in the case of Kotaghiri Venkata v. Velanki Venkata [1900] 24 Mad. 1. Mr. Sen has further contended that if the High Court judgment is not a new matter within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C., the reversal of the judgment of the Additional District Judge is at any rate sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 47, Rule 1. I am unable to agree with this contention. As has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in Chhaju Ravi v. Neki A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 112 the words 'sufficient reason' must be some reason analogous to the reasons which have been stated in Order 47, Rule 1, Civil P.C. With regard to the contention that in any event this Court should interfere under Section 151, Civil P.C. I have only to state that it would be a patent misapplication by the Court of Section 151, Civil P.C. if the Court in the exercise of its inherent power assumes jurisdiction by way of review where it is expressly forbidden by the legislature to entertain such application See Kanai Lal v. Jatindar Nath [1918] 45 Cal. 519. All the grounds urged by the petitioners, therefore, fail. The result is that I discharge this rule with costs. I assess the hearing-fee at two gold mohurs.


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