1. The main point argued by the appellant is really settled against him in this Court. It has been consistently held that Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure only governs suits for the vindication of the rights of the public in public charitable trusts, and not suits for vindicating the plaintiff's right of management and getting possession for the purpose of management of the trust properties. Following the decision in Appeal No. 368 of 1919 we hold that a suit by a trustee against a person whom he alleges to have been lawfully dismissed is nonetheless outside the scope of Section 92 because it asks for an account of the trust money received and payment of the amount due. It. is sought to distinguish that case on the ground that the plaintiff has in his plaint claimed to sue on behalf of the community. This is not so; be claimed as trustee to recover the property to be vested in him on behalf of the temple and for the common interest of the village: this simply means to be vested in him as trustee. Then it is argued that be had converted his suit into a representative suit and reliance is placed on the language of his petition; but Seshagiri Aiyar, J., who revised the order of the Munsif refusing leave, expressly says, 'it is desirable that in suits in which the rights of a trustee are litigated, the plaintiffs should be permitted to put forward all claims which would enable them to maintain the suit.' Further it appears from the judgment in Budree Das Musim v. Chooni Lal Johurry 33 C. 789 at p. 799 : 10 C.W.N. 581 that in that suit the plaintiff joined, to his right as trustee, his personal right and a representative character, and yet the suit was held not barred by Section 92. In that case all the authorities were elaborately discussed by Woodroffe, J., and in Appeal No. 368 of 1919, which we are following, the conclusions of Woodroffe, J., were accepted and adopted by this Court. The decision of the lower Appellate Court is, therefore, correct and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.