1. In this case the appellant was convicted by a Special Magistrate exercising powers under Section 24 of Bengal Act XII of 1932 of an offence under Section 6 (3) of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1930 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of Rs. 50 or in default, to rigorous imprisonment for 3 months more.
2. The case for the prosecution was that the appellant is a very important member of the revolutionary party and that the Local Government made an order in writing (Ex. 1), under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930, on June 6, 1934, directing that he should be arrested without warrant and committed to custody. Attempts were made to serve the order personally, but as the accused could not be found, it was served by affixing it to the door at his last known place of residence and at his father's house, according to the provisions of Section 71 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Of the due diligence required by this section the Local Government is the sole judge under Section 3 (2) of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1930.
3. The Local Government in exercise, of the powers conferred by the last mentioned section issued a Notification (Ex. 2) on July 24, 1934, directing the accused to appear within 15 days for the purpose of receiving the said order. The time allowed expired on August 7. On August 9, a clerk in the District Intelligence Branch Office, Barisal, discovered the accused at his residence and questioned him. He gave his name as Rabindra Chakravarty and his address as Kola in the District of Dacca. As he spoke in a hesitating manner, the clerk's suspicion was aroused and he took the accused to the Inspector of Police, who arrested him as an absconder, and subsequently he was charged, tried and convinced as already stated. He pleaded not guilty and his defence was that he was not aware of the issue of the notification, but he did not tender any evidence.
4. The learned Advocate who appeared for the appellant argued that the prosecution had failed to show that the authorities had complied strictly with the requirements of this special legislation. The only point of substance was that it had not been proved that the Government had formed the opinion recited in the first paragraph of the Notification.
5. In my opinion, it is not necessary to call any witness to prove this. The Notification was duly authenticated within the meaning of Section 49 of the Government of India Act and signed by the Additional Secretary to the Government of Bengal. The Court is entitled to presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed, by reason of the provisions of Section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act and the maxim Omnia Praesumentur rite esse acta, and the recital in the Notification that such was the opinion of Government comes within the ambit of these provisions,
6. The other point argued by the learned Advocate was raised under a misapprehension of the terms of the Notification. The appellant was directed to appear within 15 days 'of this date.' That date was the date when the order was made, namely July 24, not the date when it was published in the Calcutta Gazette, or in certain news-papers.
7. For these reasons, this appeal must be dismissed.
8. I agree.