1. It is contended that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue summons against the petitioner, on the ground that the petitioner's name did not appear in the order passed by the District Judge under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, on which these proceedings originated. It is not necessary to refer to all the rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, as admittedly his case depends on the applicability of the one on which he mainly relies, Mahomed Bhakku v. Queen-Empress 28 C. 532: 12 Ind. Dec. (N. S.) 354. The applicability of' this decision was questioned by the learned1 Counsel who appeared for the Crown; He relied on the decision in Essan Chunder Dutt v. Prannauth Choudhry Marshall 270W. R. (F. B.) 71: 2 Hay 236. and there appears to us to be considerable force in his contention that the reasons given in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock have lost none of their force in consequence of the alterations that have been subsequently made in Section 476 of the present Criminal Procedure Code, compared with Section 171 of the Code of 1861 which was in force when that Base was decided, The order, which was Considered in Mahomed Bhakku's case (1), ran in, this form 'I further direct that the case be sent to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for investigation and trial of-the charges under Sections 193, 225, 468 and-471, against the plaintiff or some other person or persons who may be implicated in filing the first written statement of this case, together with the vakalatnama.' It does not show under what law it was passed, and is clearly, as was held by the learned. Judges, indefinite. They held that the officer who had passed the order should have held ah enquiry and removed the uncertainty. In this case, however, a definite person has been directed to be-prosecuted and the offence has been definitely stated1 and this case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. But it is unnecessary to discuss this point, as it appears to us that even accepting the law as laid down in Mahomed, Bhakku's case (1) there is no legal defect in the Magistrate's proceedings. The order of the District Judge, dated 10th August 1915, on which the proceedings commenced, named a definite person Ram Prosad, against whom proceedings were to be taken, and was strictly according to law. The present petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in the Civil Court and as the offence which appeared to have been committed was one of those described in Clause (1) (c) of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, neither sanction under that section nor a complaint of the Court under Section 476 was a necessary precedent to proceedings against him. It is contended that, if the Magistrate did not take cognizance of the offence committed by the petitioner on the basis of the order under Section 476, as he has not taken cognizance in any of the manners provided by Section 190, Criminal Procedure Code, he has no jurisdiction to enquire into or try the case against the petitioner. But the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the taking cognizance of offences, and not of offenders. A Magistrate who has legally taken cognizance of an offence is seized of the whole matter and it is his duty to deal with the evidence brought before, him and see that justice is done in regard to any who may be proved by the evidence to be concerned in that offence. [See Charu Chandra Das v. Narendra Krishna Chakravarti 4 C. W. N. 367] The action of the Magistrate is in no way limited, in regard to proceedings against persons concerned in an offence, by his power in regard to taking cognizance of an offence as it may be originally disclosed. Having taken cognizance of an offence he has jurisdiction to hold judicial proceedings in regard to all persons who, the evidence shows, are the offenders: Bishen Doyal Rai v. Chedikhan 4 C. N. 560.
2. A similar application on similar grounds was made by another accused in this case, Jatindra Nath Chowdhury. A Rule was issued by another Bench of this Court to show cause why the proceeding against him should not be quashed and that Rule was discharged and it was held that the order summoning him could not be complained of on the ground of illegality. We are also of opinion that for the reasons stated above there is nothing illegal in the order summoning the present petitioner Giridhari Lal Sarowgee.
3. The Rule is accordingly discharged.