Wort, Ag. C.J.
1. In my judgment the judgment of the learned Judge in the Court below cannot possibly stand. It has got to be remembered that the only question with which this Court has to deal is whether the Judge in the Court below has decided any question of law erroneously. I am not entitled to reverse the decision of the Court below on a question of fact, nor do I propose to do, but having regard to what the learned Judge in the Court below has found, it will be seen, as I have said, that the judgment cannot possibly stand.
2. The plaintiff brought an action for compulsory registration of a sale-deed under Section 77 of the Registration Act. The trial Court granted the plaintiff's prayer but the Appellate Court for reasons which it is impossible for me to understand has concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to compulsory registration but he is entitled to the return of the consideration.
3. Now the defence set up to this story is To this effect. That there had been an agreement of compromise with regard to certain matters: that during those compromise negotiations the defendant put his thumb impression on the blank piece of paper, the paper being for the purpose of drawing up the terms of the compromise; that having found that the plaintiff was acting fraudulently, he declined to negotiate further, but a subsequent effort was made to compromise and again the plaintiff was found to be acting fraudulently and then the defendant contends in his written statement that that being so, the whole agreement became null and Void. By that plea 1 understand him to mean that some definite settlement had been arrived at but that owing to the conduct of the plaintiff he, the defendant, declined to proceed further with the matter. It is an impossible story whichever way one looks at it, but I refer to it merely to show as a comment upon She decision at which the learned Judge has arrived. If the defendant's story were accepted, it is obvious that the plaintiff would be entitled to nothing. But the learned Judge has, as I have already stated, found that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of his consideration money. That is tantamount to finding that the agreement upon which the plaintiff sues is a valid agreement. It is pointed out by the learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant that the defence is that the whole agreement between the parties was null and void. It is quite clear, in my judgment, that the learned Judge in the Court below has not set aside the decision of the trial Court that the agreement with regard to which the plaintiff was suing was a valid one. That must be held to be so, otherwise the Judge in the Court below could not have found that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of Rs. 221, the consideration money and it is on that footing that I must dispose of this case, that is to say, that the agreement sued upon was a valid agreement. If the plaintiff was entitled to the return of his money, the decision is merely a decision on a question of law, whether the Judge had exercised what he considers to be his discretion in favour or against the plaintiff as the case might be under Section 77 of the Registration Act. The finding being tantamount to a finding in favour of the plaintiff, there are no grounds either stated in the judgment or shown by the arguments to which I have listened which would entitle the learned Judge in the Court below to have reversed the finding of the trial Court.
4. In those circumstances, in my judgment, the judgment of the District Judge must be set aside and the decision of the Munsif restored with costs throughout.