Lawrence Jenkins, C.J.
1. The occasion of this appeal is a sale under the Bengal Lind Revenue Sales Act of 1859, and though there has bean much and prolonged discussion, the matter appears to me to admit of a very simple and short solution.
2. The facts are not in dispute and I need not recite them. The plaintiff's grievance is that he is kept out of possession of a certain village and is wrongly kept out, inasmuch as the defendants erroneously claim to be entitled to that village by virtue of, the revenue sale to which I have alluded. The plaintiff's case is that though this village or a share in it to which he is entitled is an integral part of the revenue unit, in respect of which there were arrears, in fact it did not pass on the revenue sale. Notwithstanding the argument that has been addressed to us, I still think, as I did at the outset, that the Collector could only sell the revenue unit in its entirety. A Collector has not an innate power to sell. His power to sell is that which is vested in him by the Legislature: and, as I read the provisions of the Legislature, he is entitled to sell a revenue unit in its entirety, whether it be an estate or a share and nothing less. He is not entitled to dismember that revenue unit for the purposes of realization of arrears. I agree that that is not necessarily conclusive of this case, bat it throws a flood of light on it, for it justifies the finding of the lower Appellate Court, which, I think, we should accept as final, that in this case it was the intention of the Collector to sell this revenue unit, in other words, Towzi No. 134/6. If then his only power was to sell Towzi No. 134/6 and it was his intention to sell that revenue unit, the fact that there may have been a misdescription in other parts of the notification, does not entitle the plaintiff to succeed in this suit. It may have been a very good ground for impugning the sale on the ground of irregularity. But the plaintiff repudiates the idea that this is the nature of this suit, and this he had to do to escape from the answer furnished by Section 33 of the Act. But, inasmuch, as this is not a suit that impugns the sale but merely contends that the sale had not the effect of passing the whole of Towzi No. 134/6, in view of the finding of the District Judge, the suit must fail.
3. On these grounds I would confirm the decree with costs payable to defendant. No. 4; the costs of defendant No. 5 have already been provided.
N. Chaterjea, J.
4. I agree.