1. These two appeals have been preferred by defendants 1 and 2, respectively from a decree of the Additional District Judge of Howrah, confirming a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, of that place. The suit was one for partition and for some other reliefs with which we are no longer concerned. The claim for partition was based on the following allegations : - One Ganesh Chandra Chakravarty was the father of the plaintiff, defendant 1 and defendant 2's husband Prosanna. The properties in suit belonged to Ganesh and he during his lifetime desired to give one-third share thereof to the plaintiff who was her daughter but being unable to carry out this wish, directed his sons, namely Prosanna and defendant 1 to do so after his death, that in accordance with this direction Prosanna, the eldest son, during the minority of defendant 1, and for himself and as guardian of defendant 1, made a gift of a one-third share of the properties to the plaintiff. Defendant 3 is a purchaser of one of the plots from defendant 2. The defence denied the gift and also challenged its validity.
2. In S.A. No. 15 of 1927, defendant 2 is the appellant. On her behalf the genuineness of the transaction has been questioned The findings of the Courts below are conclusive on this question.
3. In S.A. No. 14 of 1927 in which defendant 1 is the appellant the validity of the gift is questioned. The first question that arises upon this contention is whether the gift was void or voidable. Prosanna admittedly was the elder brother of defendant 1 and karta of the family, and the natural guardian of the latter, on the death of their father. The Hindu Law makes no distinction between a gift and other kinds of alienation. The guardian of a minor cannot give away his ward's property in charity, and under ordinary circumstances the karta of a family cannot bind the other members of the family by making an alienation in the nature of a gift. But the Hindu Law does allow a gift even of immovable property by a guardian, just as much as by a karta, for the benefit of the estate or for necessity : see the Mitakshara Chap. 1, Section 1, paras. 28 and 29; and Kalu v. Barsu  19 Bom. 803. It cannot, therefore, be said that the gift will not operate on the share of defendant 1 under any circumstances or that it was altogether void. There is clear authority for the proposition that however much a guardian may have exceeded his powers, or otherwise acted improperly in his trusts, his acts will be rendered binding on the ward by being ratified or acquiesced in, by him, after he has attained majority : C.C.C. Venkatachala Reddyar v. Rangaswamy  8 M.I.A. 319 and Ramaswami Aiyar v. Venkataramaiyar  2 Mad. 91. Nothing in the shape of a justifying necessity has been proved in the present case. The true-question therefore is whether there has been ratification or acquiescence.
4. On the question of ratification or acquiescence the finding of the learned District Judge is that
some 10 or 12 years after the execution of the deed of gift the provisions of that deed had actually been put into operation between the parties.
5. This finding, he has arrived at upon two documents only, viz. Exs. 1 and 3 which, in our opinion do not by themselves lead to any such conclusion. They only go to indicate that defendant 1 knew that the plaintiff held some share-under a gift from Prasanna, and even though they conveyed an information to defendant 1 as to the quantum of that share, they do not show that defendant 1 was aware that the plaintiff had got under the gift a half of one-third out of the share of defendant 1. There are we find other materials on the record on which a finding on the question of ratification or acquiescence was arrived at by the trial Court, but the learned District Judge has not dealt with those materials or examined them with a view to see whether they would support such a finding.
6. The decree of the lower appellate Court is accordingly set aside and the case is remanded to that Court to rehear the appeal on the aforesaid question and then to dispose of it finally.
7. The result is that S. A. 15 is dismissed but without costs, and S. A. 14 is allowed in the manner indicated above, costs therein being dependent on the result of the remand.