1. In this case the opposite party is a school master. He was appointed by the petitioner who was the Secretary of the Lohajang High School provisionally as a teacher in January, 1923, on a pay of Rs. 45 a month and joined his post, In the following March the Committee resolved that owing to financial stringency they could not keep six graduates on the staff and so they determined that the opposite party's services and those of two others be dispensed with. No action appears to have then been taken in the matter which came up again on the 24th July and then the Committee finally dispensed with the opposite party's services resolving that he will not be required after the 16th of August. He then on the 16th of August ceased to work and was paid up to that date, at the rate of Rs. 45 a month. He appears to have claimed that he was entitled to some notice and that he only got notice on the 8th of August but waiting for sometime just within the period of limitation he brought a suit in the Small Cause Court to recover six months' pay The learned Small Cause Court Judge gave him a personal decree against the petitioner for three months' pay A Rule has been obtained on two grounds urged. First, that the decree should not have been a personal one against the petitioner but against the petitioner as Secretary of the School and, secondly, that anyhow the opposite party was not entitled to more than one month's notice. Now, there was no written contract between the parties as to the period of notice necessary before the opposite party's services could be dispensed with. He was, therefore, entitled to a reasonable notice. I have carefully considered the evidence, and the facts of this case and so far as notice is concerned it appears to me not unreasonable to give the opposite party three months' pay in lieu of a reasonable amount of notice. It cannot be said that six or seven days was sufficient notice and it is not likely that he would be able to find some other place where he would earn his livelihood within even one month when he was dismissed in the middle of August. So far as that point, therefore, is concerned, the Rule must fail. As to the other point, the learned Small Cause Court Judge appears to me to have fallen into an error. He says that the man was appointed by the Secretary without the authority of the Committee and so the Committee are not liable and he is personally liable as the Committee refused to confirm him when the matter came up before it, This does not appear to be the fact. It appears that ho was appointed (no doubt provisionally) by the Secretary but at the first meeting afterwards of the Committee he was recognised as one of the staff but the Committee regretted that they were unable to retain him as such owing to financial stringency. In my opinion, therefore, this is not a case which comes under Section 235 of the Contract Act so as to make the petitioner personally liable for the pay.
2. The decree, therefore, will be varied and will be against the Secretary and the Committee of the School instead of against the petitioner personally. In the circumstances I allow no costs.