1. This Rule is directed against an order of the District Magistrate of Rangpur directing the prosecution of the petitioner Chandra Kishore Roy on charges under sections 469, 471 and 474, Indian Penal Code. It appears that Chandra Kishore Roy was an accused in a case under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, and that in the course of the proceedings in that case before the Joint Magistrate of Rangpur Mr. Sells, a certain document, Exhibit H, was used in evidence on behalf of the accused, Mr. Sells having heard the evidence in the case, it appears, proceeded on leave on the 11th March 1916, without writing or pronouncing judgment. It further appears that on the 19fch April following while still on leave he forwarded to the District Magistrate of Rangpur what purported to be a judgment which he had written and signed on that date. The District Magistrate of Rangpur, forming the opinion that this so-called judgment was no judgment, transferred the case to his own file and proceeded to deal with it under the provisions of Section 350, Criminal Procedure Code. Having examined the record, on the 3rd July, the District Magistrate thought it proper into accede to an application made by the Public Prosecutor under Section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, and permitted that officer to withdraw from that prosecution. On the 2nd August having meanwhile examined the stamp vendor who sold the stamp paper on which the document was written, he formed the opinion that there were grounds for believing that the document was a forgery. Having further given the accused an opportunity of showing cause, the Magistrate on the date already mentioned made the order against which the present Rule is directed.
2. It is conceded before us that the judgment, or the document which purports to be a judgment, written and signed by Mr, Sells when he had proceeded on leave and had ceased to exercise jurisdiction in the case, is in fact no judgment, and that, therefore, the case pending against the accused under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, had not terminated. The follows that when Mr. Gupta transferred the case to his own file and proceeded to deal with it, the case was before him in his judicial capacity and the proceedings before him were judicial proceedings. That being so, it cannot be said that the offences as to which he has directed the prosecution of the petitioner were not, within the words of Section 476 of the Code, brought under his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding. We are, therefore, unable to hold that he had no jurisdiction to make the order in question and, therefore, the ground on which the Rule was issued fails.
3. It has further been argued before us that in fact the materials before the District Magistrate were not sufficient to warrant the order now in question. But we are of opinion that the Magistrate has shown that he had sufficient grounds or reasons for the opinion that there were grounds for enquiring into the offences as to which the prosecution has been directed.
4. That being so, without seeking to say anything on the merits which at this stage, in our opinion, would be improper for us tc do, we discharge this Rule.