Lawrence Jenkins, C.J.
1. This case comes before, us by way of second appeal, the suit being one by which the plaintiffs seek a declaration of their right to a pattah in a four-anna share in the lands described in the schedule, for relief in respect of that 4-anna share and for possession.' The suit is based on a solenamah or agreement of compromise, by which the differences in a former suit, that is suit No. 350 of 1903, were compared.
2. The defendants have objected to the plaintiffs' claim on several grounds, but on appeal the only point discussed has been whether or not the solenamah was admissible in evidence. The view that has found favour with the lower Courts and also with Mr. Justice Sharf-ud-din, before whom the case came by way of appeal in the first instance, has been that it was inadmissible and, it is from the judgment confirming the decree of the lower appellate Court that the present appeal is preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
3. Before us it has been contended by the appellant that the lower Courts and Mr. Justice 8harf-ud-din committed an error in so far as they held that the document and its terms had not been proved; and, it has been contended that there was no need for registration, first, because the terms were embodied in a decree or order of the Court, and, secondly, because the document did not actually amount to a lease but merely created a right to obtain another document which, when executed, would create an interest in land.
4. The first of these points is one of considerable interest, and though two decisions of this Court, Birbhadra Rath v. Kalpataru Panda 1 C.L.J. 388 and Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrika Singh 5 C.L.J. 611, are opposed to the appellant's contention, it certainly is worthy of consideration whether the view that prevailed in Gobinda Chandra Pal v. Dwarka Nath Pal 35 C. 837 : 12 C.W.N. 849 : 7 C.L.J. 492, does not give a truer exposition of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Pranal Annee's Case 22 M. 508 : 26 I.A. 101 : 3 C.W.N. 485. In the view, however, that J take of this case, it is unnecessary to decide that point, because in my opinion, the solenamah here does not amount to a lease within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. On a fair reading of the document, I think that no immediate interest was created,--there was no present demise--and that the document was merely an agreement to create a lease on a future day the terms of which were to be defined by documents to be thereafter executed. The case, therefore, seems 1 o me to fall within Clause (h) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. This being so, I think the appellants have rightly contended before us that the document was admissible in evidence. The result of that view is that the decree of the lower appellate Court cannot be sustained. We, therefore, setaside thatdecree and the--plaintiffs undertaking to execute the requisite qabidiat--we direct defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to execute a pattah in respect of 2 annas share of the whole mouzah in accordance with the terms of the solenamah, and that the plaintiffs do thereupon recover from the defendant possession of the property; liberty will be reserved to the plaintiffs to apply to us in case any difficulty arises in getting the pattah executed or otherwise.
5. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 will pay the plaintiffs' costs throughout.
6. I agree.