1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the District Judge of Midnapore reversing the judgment and decree of the Munsif, 2nd Court, Midnapore, and arises out of a suit for the recovery of the money in lieu of paddy on a mortgage bond. The defendant (now respondent) admitted execution of the mortgage-bond but plead-ed that it had been satisfied by the execution of a subsequent bond (Exhibit A) on the 30th Baisakh 1323 corresponding to the 13th May 1916. The trial Court disbelieved the story of payment. On appeal the District Judge held that the bond in suit had been satisfied and discharged by the execution of the second bond and accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit with costs.
2. The plaintiff has now filed this second appeal. In our opinion the matter is concluded by the finding of fact arrived at by the first appellate Court. The learned District Judge has found that the bond in suit was satisfied and discharged by the second bond. That is a finding of fact with which we cannot interfere unless it can be shown that there is no evidence to support it or that it has been influenced by an erroneous view of the law. It is clear that there is evidence on which such a finding could be arrived at and the learned District Judge has given reasons for his conclusion. Whether these reasons are good reasons or bad reasons it is not necessary for us to consider. If we did, we should be virtually hearing an appeal on the facts. The learned Vakil for the appellant has argued that the second bond was cumulative and not substitutionary and that the original obligation, the mortgage bond was not destroyed thereby unless it has been distinctly found that that was the intention of the parties. It seems to us that that is in effect the finding of the District Judge. He has also found that there was a satisfactory explanation of the omission on the part of the plaintiff to return the first bond.
3. In the result we find that no case has been made out for our interference in second appeal.
4. Nor do we see any reason to suppose that substantial justice has not been done. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs and the decree of the lower appellate Court is affirmed.