1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge of Pabna, dated the 15th August 1917. The matter that was before the learned Judge and out of which this appeal arises was a reference for settlement of a dispute as to the apportionment of compensation made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and the reference is clearly stated on the record to have been made under Section 30 of the Act. The appellants are the Patnidars and the respondents Are the Zemindars. The appellants say that they want the Zemindars to have all the compensation and, in lieu thereof, they want the Court to reduce their rent. The Zemindars apparently want the Patnidars to have all the compensation and not to have the rent reduced. The first point that was taken in the appeal was with reference to the jurisdiction of the learned Additional District Judge to hear the matter. It was suggested that the learned Additional District Judge had no power to hear it because he did not come under the definition in Section 3, Sub-Section (d), of the Land Acquisition Act as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The learned Additional District Judge is not a Court. He is a Judge of a Court just in the same way as the District Judge and, although in, these Mofussil proceedings the Court is frequently identified with a particular Judge; yet there is manifestly a distinction between a Court and a Judge. That the learned Additional District Judge is a Judge of this principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is clear. He is nothing else. He is a Judge of the District Court: not the first Judge or the second Judge. He comes after the District Judge. If be is a Judge of this principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, the only question would be, 'Had he power to dispose of this particular matter.' It is quite clear that he had under the provisions of the Bengal, N. W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act XII of 1887. The matter having been duly made over to him by the District Judge, he had jurisdiction, as a Judge of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, to dispose of it. That view was taken by Mr. Justice Teunon and Mr. Justice Greaves in R.A. No. 245 of 1917. They were clearly right.
2. The other point is this under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the question whether the Patnidars should have their rent abated is not a matter falling within the competence of the Court. The question under Section 30 is one of apportionment and apportionment only, and the reducing of the rent is not the question falling within it.
3. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.