1. In this application for revision the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Midnapur is complained of on the ground that he has refused, under Sction 10, Civil Procedure Code, to stay the trial of a rent suit. The case made by the defendants petitioners is that the plaintiffs, the Midnapur Zemindary Company, are the proprietors of a certain tuwji and are also the darputnidars; that the defendants are the putnidars; that the dispute in question is as to whether in these circumstances the plaintiffs are entitled to make the defendants, putnidars, pay certain cesses. It appears that a rent-suit (No. 9 of 1916), was brought by the plaintiffs and was decreed, Ex parte; that to counteract this, the defendants brought a title suit (No. 262 of 1919); that the plaintiffs thereafter brought a rent-suit (No. 80 of 1918), and that at the present moment the position is, that, although the defendants have lost at the trial of these suits, these two suits are pending in appeal. In these circumstances, they say that in the present suit which is a suit of 1922 and which concerns the cesses alleged to be due from Aswin 1326 to Falgoon 1329, the defendants are entitled to claim the benefit of Section 10, Civil Procedure Code. Now the learned Subordinate Judge has decided the matter upon the ruling that as the prior suits are pending in appeal they are not suits within the meaning of Section 10 of the Code. As to that, I am of opinion that that decision is erroneous; and I may observe that if it has ever been held under the old Code that the reference to 'Courts whether superior or inferior' was a reason for holding that Section 10 applied, where the previous suit is at the appellate stage, that is an instance of a correct conclusion arrived at for an entirely inadequate reason. The presence or absence of those words--'whether superior or inferior' does not in my judgment affect the question one way or the other. I think that the reference at the end of the section to 'His Majesty in Council' shows that for this purpose 'suit' includes appearand in a case which was not referred to in the argument, but which I have discovered from Mr. Sen's book on the Bengal Tenancy Act, a Division Bench of this Court has before new dealt with this question and has ruled to that effect. I refer to the case of Bepin Behary Mozumdar v. Jogendra Chandra Ghosh 36 Ind. Cas. 641 : 24 C.L.J. 514. 514. It remains, therefore, for me to say whether Section 10 applies to the case before me. I am of opinion that it does not. The case to which I have just referred is, in my judgment, an authority completely covering that point also. The position is this. The present suit is for cess which has accrued due after the institution of the last of the pending suits. It is a suit for a different debt altogether, for a debt which was not in existence when the last of the previous suits was brought. When I come to apply Section 10 it does not appear to me that any of the changes made in the code of 1908 has any effect so as to make the Section application where the suits are for distinct and different debts. It is quite true that in a very well-known judgment of that distinguished learned Judge Mr. Justice Mahmud, which is reported as Balkishan v. Kishan Lal 11 A 148 : A.W.N. (1899) 42 : 13 Ind. Jur. 309 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 523, he under the former Code dealt with this question by saying that the former and the later suits were for different reliefs and it is quite true that certain words about the relief have been omitted from the later version of the Code. The observations made by Mr. justice Mahmud were sufficient to show that under the old Code such a suit as I have now to deal with was net affected by Section 10. But it must be observed that judgment for the recovery of subsequent ceses does not difter mercly as being for a different form of relief. It is the Same kind of relief for an entirely separate subject-matter; namely, a debt which was not in existence at all at the time of the previous suit. It does not follow because the words 'the same relief' are no longer in the section that Section 10 is applicable to suits for recovery of successive rents. I will draw attention in this connection to one further point. Under the new Code it is clear that the section will not apply unless the previous suit is before a Court which is competent to grant the relief clamed on the present suit. That by itself shows that the Section cannot apply to clains for rent due at successive periods altogether. Nobody can doubt that, whatever may be the result of the suits new pending in appeal, the Court cannot possibly give judgment thereunder for cesses that fell due long after the institution of the suits. For these reasons I am of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge reached the right result when he held that Section 10 had no application. I will only say that if at any subsequent stage an application apart altogether from Section 10 is made to the Court below upon terns which that Court shall think reasonable,then that Court will he in no way prejudiced by anything that I have said if it is minded to exercise any power in favour of the defendant other than the power given by Section 10. The Rule is discharged with costs--one gold mohur.