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Chaudhuri Meah and ors. Vs. Abdul Rahaman - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in58Ind.Cas.349
AppellantChaudhuri Meah and ors.
RespondentAbdul Rahaman
Cases ReferredMr. Hume Public Prosecutor v. Poresh Chunder Ghose An Attorney In
Excerpt:
criminal procedure code (act v of 1898), section 195 - sanction to prosecute--matters to be considered--proceedings likely to prove abortive--sanction, refusal of. - .....to show cause why an order sanctioning the prosecution of the seven petitioners by mr. ghatak, the learned judge, should not be get aside.2. the matter cornea before us under section 195(6) of the code of criminal procedure, which provides that 'any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate,' and, this court has to decide whether the sanction given by the learned sessions judge should be revoked in the case of all the petitioners or in the case of any of them. the conclusion of the learned judge's judgment was in these terms: 'i accordingly sanction prosecution of the opposite parties or such of them as are guilty of the offences mentioned or any of such offences.' it was argued by.....
Judgment:

Lancelot Sanderson, C.J.

1. This is a Rule granted to show cause why an order sanctioning the prosecution of the seven petitioners by Mr. Ghatak, the learned Judge, should not be get aside.

2. The matter cornea before us under Section 195(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that 'Any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate,' and, this Court has to decide whether the sanction given by the learned Sessions Judge should be revoked in the case of all the petitioners or in the case of any of them. The conclusion of the learned Judge's judgment was in these terms: 'I accordingly sanction prosecution of the opposite parties or such of them as are guilty of the offences mentioned or any of such offences.' It was argued by the learned Vakil who appeared on behalf of the petitioners that this order was irregular and could not stand and that the learned Judge ought to have decided with regard to each of the petitioners whether it was proper to sanction the prosecution against him, The learned Vakil who appeared for the complainant has abandoned his application for sanction as regards petitioners Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7; and consequently inasmuch as the application was on behalf of the complainant alone, the Crown having taken no part in the proceedings, I do not think it is necessary to investigate the case of those petitioners any further; and, as far as petitioner Nos. 4 to 7 are concerned, the sanction which has been granted is revoked.

3. As regards the other three petitioners before arriving at our decision it is necessary to state certain facts, which, I think, slow that the proceedings in this case were cut of the ordinary: It appears that one Chandhuri Meah lodged a case against Abdul Rabaman under Section 471 and other sections. The Magistrate summoned the accused Abdul Rahaman and held an enquiry in his presence in the course of which a large number of witnesses were examined at the instance of Chaudhuri Meah, and they were cross-examined at some length by the accused. The Magistrate disbelieved Chaudhuri Meah's case, discharged' the accused and ordered that Chaudhuri Meah and his witnesses Nobin Chandra. Mojumdar and Kashi Chandra Mojumdar, who are the second and third petitioners in this Court, should be prosecuted for bring a false case. Against that order a motion was preferred before the learned Sessions Judge who, after an investigation, held that there was sufficient evidence against Abdul Rahaman and that the order of discharge was improper on the evidence. The result was that the learned Judge set aside the order of discharge and directed a further inquiry. The case was beard by another Deputy Magistrate, who found that there was a prima facie case against the accused Abdul Bahaman and committed him to the Sessions. The case was tried before Mr. De, the learned Sessions Judge, and the accused was acquitted, the learned Judge saying that he acquitted him on the ground that he considered that there was a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. During these proceedings, the order for the pro-secution of Chaudhuri Meah and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 was in abeyanoe. Then Chaudhnri Meah, Nobin and Kashi applied to the learned Sessions Judge to refer the order for the prosecution of them to the High Court, so that it might be quashed. The learned Judge refused so to do and gave a considered judgment setting out his reasons for his refusal. Then as application was made to the High Court for a Rule to set aside the order made by the Magistrate, directing the prosecution of Chaudhuri Meah and his two witnesses. Upon that application my learned brothers Mr. justice Richardson and Mr. Justice Shamsul Huda set aside the order, mainly on the ground that it was made more than a year ago and at a time when the evidence had Dot been so fully brought before the Court as it was afterwards. They, therefore, set aside that order, but directed that an application might be made by the District Magistrate to the learned Sessions Judge to make an order under Section 476. They also directed that it would be open to the learned Sessions Judge, if he was moved under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to sanction the prosecution of the petitioners. Subsequently an application was made to Mr. Ghatak, the learned Sessions Judge, for sanction to prosecute not only Chaudhuri Meah and his two witnesses Nobin and Kashi but also the other petitioners, and thereupon the learned Judge made the order which I have read.

4. Now, the question remains whether my learned brother and I are prepared to uphold the sanction which has been granted by the learned Sessions Judge as regards the first three petitioners Chaudhuri Meah, Nobin and Kashi.

5. I desire it to be clearly understood that anything I say in my judgment is not intended to be in any way departing from or minimising what was said by the late learned Chief Justice in Mr. Hume Public Prosecutor v. Poresh Chunder Ghose An Attorney In re 22 Ind. Cas. 321 : 41 C. 446 : 15 Cr. L.J. 49 At page 458 Page of 41 C.--Ed. he said: 'There are, however, certain rules of prudence to which any Court exercising its discretion would have regard, and pre-eminent among them, possibly, a compendious statement of all, would be the rule that the Court will be astute to see that there shall be no abuse of the administration of criminal justice.' The learned Chief justice had already pointed out that the matter was one for the discretion of the Court to which the application was made. Our decision in this case is arrived at upon the peculiar and somewhat special facts of this case, and the conclusion at which we arrive is that the sanction which has been granted with regard to the first three petitioners should be revoked. In my judgment the matters disclosed in the various judgments and proceedings to which I have referred go to show that if proceedings were taken against these three petitioners, there is a strong probability that they would be abortive. On these grounds in my judgment the sanction should be revoked.

6. The Rule is made absolute as regards all the petitioners.

Duval, J.

7. I agree.


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