Rampini and Pratt, JJ.
1. This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs, dated the 25th July 1900.
2. The case, out of which the appeal arises, is an execution ease. The respondent in this appeal had obtained a decree and, in execution of his decree, certain property belonging to the appellant was sold. The sale was confirmed. The decree-holder took possession on the 16th of August, 1899. Then the judgment-debtor put in an application for the setting side of the sale on the ground of irregularity and fraud. The application was contested and, on the 16th of December, 1899, the judgment-debtor put in a compromise petition to which the decree-holder consented, and it was agreed that the judgment-debtor should have time up to 6th of February, 1900, to pay up the full decretal amount, and that then the sale should be set aside; but that if he failed, the sale should stand good. On the 6th February, 1900, the judgment-debtor paid a portion of the money and obtained further time to pay the balance. This balance he tendered on the 21st February, 1900, but the decree-holder refused, to accept it. The Munsif, on the 10th March, 1900, tried the case on the merits and set aside the sale.
3. The decree-holder appealed against that order to the District Judge, who held that the judgment-debtor was bound by his compromise of the 16th of December, 1899, and that it was not open to him to contest the legality of the sale.
4. The judgment-debtor now appeals to this Court. Two grounds are taken by the learned pleader who appears on his behalf: first, that the District Judge was wrong in his interpretation of the order of the 16th of December, 1899, and, secondly, that he was wrong in holding that the judgment-debtor was bound by his compromise petition of the 16th December, 1899.
5. We think, however, that the District Judge is right on both points. The Munsif no doubt passed an order on the 16th of December to the effect that if the money was not paid, the case would be put up on the 16th February for bichar, that is to say, for disposal. The District Judge has interpreted this to mean that, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, the case should be decided on that date, and the sale should hold good, and that is what the parties agreed to. The pleader for the appellant in this case says that bichar meant that the case should be tried on the merits. This, we think, cannot have been meant, and for the reasons given by the District Judge, viz., that this would have been a most one-sided arrangement wholly in the judgment-debtor's favour, and one which could and should never have been made, and the judgment-debtor's own conduct shows that he never understood it as meaning this. Then with regard to the District Judge's finding that the judgment-debtor was bound by his agreement of the 16th of December, we can only say that we fully concur in this view. The judgment-debtor, it appears to us, is estopped from contesting the legality of the sale. He asked for time and bound himself not to contest the validity of the sale, provided he got time. He obtained time and tie advantages of a postponement, and it is we think, quite contrary to reason and equity that he should now turn round and say that he is not bound by his agreement.
6. We think he is estopped on the principle laid down in the case of Pratap Chunder Dass.v. Arathoon (1882) I. L. R. 8. Calc. 455
7. The appeal is dismissed with costs.