Sharfuddin and Teunon, JJ.
1. In this case it appears that one Sabar Akunji and a certain number of others were charged with the commission of a dacoity on the 23th of October 1913. Under Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code pardon was tendered to Sabar Akunji and was accepted by him on the usual condition that he should make a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence in question. In the Court, of the committing Magistrate it appears that Sabar Akunji did make a statement implicating himself and others in. the commission of the dacoity. But when the trial took place in the Court of the Sessions Judge he resiled from that statement, and professed complete ignorance of the matter. Thereupon, proceedings were taken against him and he was committed to the Court of Session to take his trial. The learned Sessions Judge has thereupon made this reference to this Court with a view to have it declared that the proceedings taken against the accused were without jurisdiction on the ground that the pardon had not been, declared forfeited, and the grounds of forfeiture had not been reduced into writing. Under the present Code of Criminal Procedure, no formal withdrawal of a pardon and no formal declaration that the pardon has been forfeited are required. If the person, who has accepted a conditional pardon be subsequently proceeded against, it is open to him to plead on his trial that the pardon has not, in fact, been forfeited, that is to say that he has not violated the conditions on which the pardon was tendered and accepted. This then becomes one of the issues to be heard and determined at the trial. In the present case there is no need that the issue should be separately tried; for if on his statement made in the Court of the Committing Magistrate and on other evidence it be found that he took part in the commission of the dacoity in question, it will follow that when he resiled from his first statement in the Court of Sessions and denied all knowledge of the matter, be violated the conditions on which the pardon had been tendered. So that the two questions whether he has forfeited the pardon and whether he has or has not been guilty of the offence of dacoity may be heard and determined together. In support of this view, and for the information of the Sessions Judge, we would refer him more particularly to the following reported cases: Emperor v. Kotliia (1906) I. L. R. 30 Bom, 611., Kullan v. Emperor (1908) I. L. R. 32 Mad, 178. and Emperor v. Abani Bhushau Chuckerbutty (1910) I. L. R. 37 Calc. 845, 851. With these remarks we return the record and direct that the trial be now proceeded with.