1. This is styled as a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, wherein I am requested to set aside the order of the District Judge, Mahasu, acting as an appellate authority under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. The petition bears court-fee stamps of Rs. 2/-. There is an office objection to the effect that the petition should bear court-fees of Rs. 10/- under Article 22 of Schedule II of the Court-fees (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1952. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the court-fee paid is sufficient, since the petition does not fall under Article 22 but under Article l(d)(iii) to the Second Schedule.
2. Since a question of court-fee was involved, notice was issued to the learned Government Advocate and I have heard him as well as the learned counsel for the petitioner on the point of court-fee. Article 22 of Schedule. II would apply if the present application can be deemed to be either an application or memorandum of appealfor relief under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. It is true that the petition arises out of proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, but that would not necessarily convert this into an application for relief under that Act. As was held in--'Pitman's Shorthand Academy v. B. Lila Ram and Sons', AIR 1950 EP 181 (A):
'The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority appointed under Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, do not constitute civil Courts subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and therefore their orders are not subject to revision by the High Court.'
Therefore, this Court cannot in its revisional jurisdiction grant any relief, under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Any relief, which this Court may grant to the petitioner, will have to be under Article 227 of the Constitution, which confers, on tin's Court, powers of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals operating within the jurisdiction of this Court. In -- 'Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath', AIR 1954 SC 215 (B), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, with reference to a case from this very State, observed that:
'The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercises jurisdiction in relation to the whole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as extended to Himachal Pradesh, are certainly Tribunals, if not Courts, and they function within the territories of Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, Article 227 (1) read with Article 241 confers on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner power of superintendence over such Tribunals.
The contention based on Clause (2) of Article 227 that the Article only confers on the High Court 'administrative' superintendence over the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals cannot be accepted because Clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in Clause (1). The material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107, Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals.
Further, the preponderance of Judicial opinion in India was that Section 107 which was similar in terms to Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave' a power of 'judicial' superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 was reproduced as Section 224 in the Government of India Act, 1935, with a new Sub-section (2), which was omitted when Section 224 was reproduced with some modifications as Article 224 of the Constitution. This significant omission has been regarded by all High Courts in India as having restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, and Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915.
The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep thesubordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.'
3. It would be obvious from the above that the powers of judicial superintendence conferred on this Court, by Article 227 are independent of this Court's revisional powers. As their Lordships have pointed out, those powers of superintendence conferred by Article 227 are to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority. Thus, this is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court and such jurisdiction can be exercised not only with reference to a case arising out Of a Punjab Urban Bent Restriction Act, but to all cases. Such jurisdiction is exercised, not to grant 'relief as contemplated under Article 22 of Schedule II but to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority. It, therefore, follows that the case would be governed not by Article 22, Schedule II, but by Article l(d)(ii). The court-fee paid (Rs. 2/-) is thus sufficient. The heading of the petition is misleading. It should have been styled as a petition under Article 227.
4. The petition will be heard on its merits regarding admission on the 26th instant.