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indira Debi Vs. Ganga Ram Munshi Ram and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtHimachal Pradesh High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Misc. Petn. No. 21 of 1952
Judge
Reported inAIR1953HP60
ActsConstitution of India - Article 227; ;East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 13; ;Limitation Act, 1908 - Section 3
Appellantindira Debi
RespondentGanga Ram Munshi Ram and anr.
Appellant Advocate K.C. Pandit, Adv.
Respondent Advocate Chandan Lal, Adv.
DispositionApplication rejected
Cases ReferredBeg Ram v. Charan Das
Excerpt:
- .....one other named mai rewati. the residential house in question was let out by the landlords to mai rewati. the appellate authority has found that mai rewati left the house a considerable time ago and put the petitioner into the house without landlords' consent. a decree for eviction of the petitioner has therefore been passed by him.3. on behalf of the petitioner, it is not denied that the house was let out to mai rewati, nor is it pleaded that there is any privity of contract between the petitioner and the landlord. what was argued before me was that under the said act the landlord could be granted a decree of eviction against the tenant but not against a subtenant.4. even if it be supposed that the proposition of law propounded on behalf of the petitioner be correct, the mere fact that.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Chowdhry, J.C.

1. This is an application in revision by one Indira Debi under Article 227 of the Constitution against the decision of the District Judge of Mahasu and Sirmur dated 17-4-1952 as an appellate authority under Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

2. The landlords Ganga Ram Munshi Ram filed an application under Section 13(2)(ii)(a) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner & one other named Mai Rewati. The residential house in question was let out by the landlords to Mai Rewati. The appellate authority has found that Mai Rewati left the house a considerable time ago and put the petitioner into the house without landlords' consent. A decree for eviction of the petitioner has therefore been passed by him.

3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is not denied that the house was let out to Mai Rewati, nor is it pleaded that there is any privity of contract between the petitioner and the landlord. What was argued before me was that under the said Act the landlord could be granted a decree of eviction against the tenant but not against a subtenant.

4. Even if it be supposed that the proposition of law propounded on behalf of the petitioner be correct, the mere fact that the lower appellate Court committed an error in deciding that point of law would not be a good ground for this Court to interfere with its decision in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. That Article, it is well established, is meant to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction & not to correct errors of decision on questions of law or questions of fact. The lower appellate Court had the jurisdiction to record a finding on the said question of law, and the mere fact that it may have committed an error in recording that finding does not mean that it had no jurisdiction to do so.

5. It may however be stated that the proposition of law propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not appear to be correct. Both the tenant and the sub-tenant have been implead-ed in this case. The former did become liable to eviction by reason of her having sublet the house to the petitioner without the consent of the landlord. The position of the sub-tenant in the circumstance being that of a trespasser, she became equally liable to eviction. There is nothing in the Act against the impleading of such a trespasser in a proceeding of eviction against the tenant. To subscribe to the view propounded by the learned counsel for the petitioner would be to make for multiplicity of suits. I therefore hold that the sub-tenant was rightly impleaded as a party in this case, and that she has been rightly ordered to put the landlord into possession of the house in question.

6. There is an office report that the present petition is time-barred by nine days, applying the 90-day rule of limitation as in the case of ordinary revisions. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no limitation prescribed for an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, nor has any rule been prescribed by this Court in respect of such petitions. That is no doubt true, and that is why I have not dismissed this petition on the mere ground of its being time-barred. It is however hereby laid down that in future applications in revision under Article 227 of the Constitution will also be subject to the 90-day rule of limitation as are ordinary applications in revision, as laid down by this Court in--'Beg Ram v. Charan Das', AIR 1951 Him. P. 16.

7. The application in revision is rejected with costs Rs. 30 (Rupees thirty) and the order of the lower appellate Court is affirmed.


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