D.B. Lal, .J.
1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for review of the judgment pronounced by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1974. The facts of the case which gave rise to this application are that Dalu and Shibi and one Tobge were prosecuted for the offence of murder under Section 302, I.P.C. It was stated that one Tiku was also engaged by the accused to commit the murder and subsequently he turned the approver and gave evidence against the accused. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused Dalu and Shibi under Sections 302 and 380, I.P.C. and sentenced them for the former to imprisonment for life. Tobge was acquitted because the case against him was not found proved beyond the realm of a reasonable doubt. Dalu and Shibi came in appeal before the High Court and a Division Bench dismissed their appeal by its judgment dated May 28, 1975. The present application is filed for review of that judgment.
2. It is contended in the grounds of review that the statement of Tiku approver was discarded so far as Tobge is concerned and as such it should have been discarded against Dalu and Shibi as well. It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab : 1969CriLJ1435 was not properly followed by the Court and there was an error apparent on the face of the record.
3. The learned Advocate-General. submitted that an application for review is not maintainable because the judgment given in the appeal cannot be altered in view of Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Assuming that the High Court has inherent power to review under Section 482, that power is to be sparingly exercised and only in a given situation where specific need is reflected as provided for in Section 482. The inherent power can be exercised to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. If it was found that there was no legal corroboration of the statement of Tiku so far as Tobge accused was concerned and hence the latter was given benefit of doubt, in our opinion no argument can be advanced that there happened an abuse of the process of the Court or the ends of justice were violated. The High Court fully appraised the evidence which was on record and agreed with the learned Sessions Judge that benefit of a reasonable doubt could be given to Tobge and as such his acquittal was not to be set aside. From this alone it could not be inferred that Tiku was not believed so far as he related against Dalu and Shibi. The High Court understood in its own way the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Piara Singh v. The State of Punjab (supra) and the fact that the learned Counsel intends to interpret that judgment in his own way, may be right or wrong, cannot be a ground for review as it neither leads to abuse of the process of the Court nor necessary to secure ends of justice. Therefore, on merits, in our opinion, the application for review is not maintainable.
4. The application is, therefore, dismissed.