1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, wherein I am requested to set aside the order of the District Judge, Mahasu, acting as the appellate authority under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himachal Pradesh. This petition arises under the following circumstances.
The petitioner applied to the Rent Controller, Solan, for the ejectment of the respondents on the ground that they had failed to pay the rent for the year 1950-51. Before the Controller the respondents contended, not only that they had paid the rent in question, but they had made an excess payment of Rs. 118/-. The Rent Controller found against the petitioner and, accordingly, dismissed the application. Then, there was an appeal by the petitioner to the learned District Judge of Mahasu, who is the appellate authority under Section 15. The latter concurred with the finding of the Rent Controller to the effect that the rent for 1950-51 had not fallen into arrears and, in fact, there was an excess payment of Rs. 118/- to the petitioner.
2. Hence, this petition, which purports to be under Article 227 of the Constitution. Petitioner No. 1 argued that the Rent Controller has erred in coming to the conclusion that the rent was only Rs. 150/- per annum, and the District Judge had also erred in relying on the respondents' account-books and in drawing an inference adverse to the petitioners due to their omission to produce their account-books before the Controller.
3. This is not a second appeal, but a petition under Article 227. As was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in--'Waryam Singh v. Amarnath', AIR 1954 SC 215 (A) (from Himachal Pradesh):
'This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C. J. in--'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee', AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) (B), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.'
In that case, both the Rent Controller and the District Judge had refused to pass an order of ejectment in spite of the fact that there was a default in payment of rent. Under those circumstances, my learned predecessor felt that it was incumbent upon him to interfere by virtue of the powers of superintendence conferred by Article 227. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in that case both the Controller and the District Judge had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an ejectment order.
4. In the present case, however, the facts aredifferent. Both the Controller and the appellateauthority have found, on facts, that there hasbeen no default in payment of rent. Consequently,it cannot be said that they have acted arbitrarilyor refused to discharge their duties. The factsof this case are clearly distinguishable from thoseof--'AIR 1954 SC 215 (A)'. I am not sittingas a Court of second appeal. I am unable tosee how it can be said that the Courts belowhave refused to exercise a jurisdiction vested inthem by law. The result is, I reject the petition.