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Dina Nath Vs. State - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtJammu and Kashmir High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1954CriLJ1070
AppellantDina Nath
RespondentState
Cases ReferredImamudin Mian v. Emperor
Excerpt:
- .....accused person was that he was carrying on his person a bag which contained a revolver with four live cartridges. before me it is argued that the manner in which the accused was carrying the revolver would show that he had no intention to use it and that all that could be said against him was that he was in possession of the revolver which would bring his case under section 19 clause (f), arms act. the applicant's learned counsel made reference to - 'bonaimuthu ambalam v. emperor' air 1925 mad 585 (a), in which it has been held that:the offence of going armed with fire-arm is considerably more narrow than the offence of being in possession merely of fire-arms. the expression 'going armed' clearly indicates two things, namely, firstly an intention to use it as a fire-arm and secondly.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Jia Lal Kilam, J.

1. This is a Revision petition (though described as an appeal) directed against an (sic) of the learned Sessions Judge Jammu dated 13th Magh 2010, whereby he has confirmed the conviction of the accused under Section 19, Clause (e) of the Indian Arms Act, but has reduced the sentence from three months to a fine of Rs. 50/-.

2. The charge against the accused person was that he was carrying on his person a bag which contained a revolver with four live cartridges. Before me it is argued that the manner in which the accused was carrying the revolver would show that he had no intention to use it and that all that could be said against him was that he was in possession of the revolver which would bring his case under Section 19 Clause (f), Arms Act. The applicant's learned Counsel made reference to - 'Bonaimuthu Ambalam v. Emperor' AIR 1925 Mad 585 (A), in which it has been held that:

The offence of going armed with fire-arm is considerably more narrow than the offence of being in possession merely of fire-arms. The expression 'going armed' clearly indicates two things, namely, firstly an intention to use it as a fire-arm and secondly the possibility of using it.

With the principle that has been enunciated in this ruling one need have no quarrel, but there is one feature which distinguishes the facts of the present case from those in - 'AIR 1925 Mad 585 (A). In the latter case, there was only one empty cartridge in the weapon and no live cartridges were found at all on the person of the accused. The fact that no live cartridges were found on the person of the accused would show that it was not possible for him to have used the weapon as a firearm, nor could any intention to use the fire-arm be gathered from it. But in the case before non the accused was carrying in his bag a revolver with four live cartridges. This alone is sufficient to point out as to what the intention of the accused was.

As already observed in this judgment somewhere, merely being in possession of arms is an offence punishable under Section 19, cl, (f), Arms Act which requires sanction under Section 29 of the Arms Act to the commencement of prosecution against an accused. If it is held that the accused was merely in possession of arms, as has been vehemently argued by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused applicant, then the case against him would be dismissed because no sanction has been secured. It is rather difficult to draw a line between possession of a weapon and going armed with it. But the circumstances of a case might suggest a correct inference as to whether the accused went armed with a weapon or had only a weapon in his possession.

3. Now in this case as already seen, the accused was carrying a revolver with four live cartridges in a bag. What would be the inference, is the question? In - 'Imamudin Mian v. Emperor' AIR 1941 Pat 284 (B), it has been held that:

To carry a weapon not in the hand but tied to the cycle in the manner of a piece of luggage may amount to going armed within the meaning of Clause (e) of Section 19.

I am in respectful agreement with this pronouncement and hold that the accused in the present case was going armed within the meaning of Section 19 Clause (e) and was not merely in possession of the weapon.

4. I, therefore, reject this Revision application.


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