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State Vs. Pir Mohd. Maqbool Yalgaml and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtJammu and Kashmir High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in1963CriLJ155
AppellantState
RespondentPir Mohd. Maqbool Yalgaml and ors.
Cases ReferredSimilarly In Trilochan Misra v. State
Excerpt:
- j.n. wazir, c.j.1. these are three revision applications directed against the orders passed by the additional sessions judge, jammu, on 12th december, 1962 in the case of pir mohd. yalgami, on 19th january, 1963 in regard to mir mohd. nazeer and on 24th january, 1963 in respect of peer abdul gani enlarging them on bail and exempting them from personal appearance in the court for specified periods during their trial.in these revision applications lie within a narrow compass. sixteen persons are standing trial before the additional sessions judge, jammu, under sub-section i21-a and 120-b r. p.c read with rule 32 of the jammu and kashmir security rules. the respondents are included among them. in the course of trial the respondents applied before the additional sessions judge on different.....
Judgment:

J.N. Wazir, C.J.

1. These are three revision applications directed against the orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, on 12th December, 1962 in the case of Pir Mohd. Yalgami, on 19th January, 1963 in regard to Mir Mohd. Nazeer and on 24th January, 1963 in respect of Peer Abdul Gani enlarging them on bail and exempting them from personal appearance in the Court for specified periods during their trial.

In these revision applications lie within a narrow compass. Sixteen persons are standing trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, under Sub-section I21-A and 120-B R. P.C read with Rule 32 of the Jammu and Kashmir Security Rules. The respondents are included among them. In the course of trial the respondents applied before the Additional Sessions Judge on different dates for enlarging them on bail and exempting them from personal appearance in Court for specified periods on grounds detailed in their applications. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after enquiring Into the grounds urged in the applications enlarged the accused on bail, and granted them exemption from personal appearance in Court under SSection 353 and 540-A of the Cods of Criminal Procedure as appears from his orders.

No revision was filed by the Stale challenging the orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge at the first instance. But it appears that the learned Additional Sessions Judge extended periods for bail as well as exemption from personal appearance in the case of each accused from time to time. The dates of last orders in respect of each accused are mentioned above against which the revision applications have been filed in this Court. In the case of Mir Mohd. Nazeer the period for which ball and exemption from personal appearance was granted by the order under revision expired in the end of January, 1963 and he has surrendered to his bail bond and has appeared before the Court. The same is the case of Pir Moh'd Maqbool Yalgami whose period of bail and exemption from personal appearance in Court expired on 10th March, 1963. Both these applications, therefore, have become Infructuous and it is not necessary for us to deal with them, although the points of law Involved In them are the same as are raised in the revision application directed against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 24th January, 1963 granting bail and exemption from personal appearance to Peer Abdul Gani Accused.

3. It is argued on behalf of the State that the teamed Additional Sessions Judge ought not to have granted bail to the accused Peer Abdul Gani as the grounds mentioned by him did not justify granting of bail in his favour especially when the offences of which the accused was charged were of a very serious nature. It is further contended that In enlarging the accused on bail the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not borne in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, In the case State v. Jagjit Singh, : [1962]3SCR622 their lordships of the Supreme Court have held Where an offence is bailable, bail has to be granted under Section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but 11 the offence is not bailable, further considerations arise and the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail In the light of those further considerations, such as, nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger Interests of the public or the State and similar other considerations, which arise when a Court is asked to admit accused to bail in a non-bailable offence. Under Section 493 of the Cods of Criminal Procedure, the powers of the High Court In the matter of granting bail are very wide; even so, where the offence Is non-bailable, various considerations such as those Indicated above have to be taken into account before bail Is granted in a non-bailable offence.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken us through the order of the Additional Sessions Judge enlarging the accused on bail and has argued that the grounds enumerated In the order or not such as would Justify the granting of bail. It is true that the nature of the offences ot which the accused is charged is serious. But, in our opinion, the trial Judge has taken Into consideration the circumstances which are necessary to be borne In mind is granting bail in case of non-bailable offence and we do not see any good reason to overset the order granting bail in revision, especially when the period of bail is going to expire, after about a fortnight, i.e., on the 24th of March, 1963.

4. The important point of law which falls for determination in these revision applications is whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to exempt the accused from personal appearance In Court under the provisions of Sub-section 353 and 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, The learned Counsel appearing for the State argued that the Additional Sessions Judge had no power under Section 353, Cr. P. C. to exempt the accused from personal appearance before him. It is contended that the only relevant provisions of the Code which empower a Magistrate to grant exemption from personal attendance to an accused are contained in Sub-section 205 and 540-A, Cr. P. C. Section 205 is not applicable to the present case as warrants were issued for arrest of the accused and the case is not covered by Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. as the accused was not physically 'incapable of remaining before the Court', Section 353, Cr. P. C. provides for recording of evidence in the presence of the accused and reads as follows:

Except as otherwise expressly provided all evidence taken under Chapters XVIII, XX, xxi, xxii and xxiii shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or, when Ms personal attendance is dispensed with, in presence of his pleader.

According to this section the presence of the accused at the time of recording evidence is necessary but there is an exception engrafted on this section as is clear from the words 'Except as otherwise expressly provided' when his personal attendance is dispensed with under some other provisions contained in the Code. The other provisions, as pointed out above, are contained in Sub-section 205 and 540-A, Cr. P. C. Section 205, Cr. P. C. applies to those eases in which a Magistrate issues a summons in the first Instance, He may under sub-Section (1) of Section 205 dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. This section does not confer upon a Judge or Magistrate power to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused where warrants have been issued for the arrest of the accused. Section 205, Cr. P. C, therefore, has no application to the present case.

5. The next question to be considered is whether under Section 353, Cr. P. C, a Judge or Magistrate is empowered to grant exemption to the accused from personal attendance In Court when he is represented by his pleader.

In our view this section does not confer upon a Judge or Magistrate any power to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused during the trial. The wordings of the section are merely descriptive and do not create any power in favour of a Judge or Magistrate. This section enjoins upon the Court recording of evidence in the presence of the accused or in the presence of his pleader when his presence Is dispensed with under certain provisions in the Code. These are found either in Section 205, which is not applicable to this case, or in Section 540-A, Cr. P. C.

It Is true that some High Courts have held that the power of granting exemption from personal attendance is implied under Section 353, Cr. P. C. In Sultan Singh v. The State, : AIR1951All864 (FB) it was held:

The scope and extent of Section 205, Criminal P. C, Is limited to the stage of the commencement of a trial and applies to a summons issued by a Magistrate under Section 204. The words 'or when his personal attendance is dispensed with' in Section 353 do not necessarily refer back merely to a case where the summonses were originally issued under Section 205 in which the presence of the accused was dispensed with and he was allowed to appear through pleader. The exemption in Section 205 should not be extended to cover the powers of a Magistrate for exemption of this attendance of an accused person at any other stage except when the Magistrate is issuing process at the commencement of the proceedings. The reference in Section 353 to the power of a trial Court to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused, therefore, clearly implies that the trial Court has such a power of granting exemption.

The same view has been taken by the Madras High Court in re Ummal Hesanath, AIR 1947 Mad 433. It was held in that case as follows:

I am inclined to take the view that Section 353 by necessary implication confers power on the presiding officer whether he is a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge or a Judge of the High Court to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused person. Chapter XVIII would cover an enquiry before the Committing Magistrate also. There appears to be a difference between the stage contemplated by Section 205 and that contemplated by Section 353. Section 205 deals with the initial appearance of the accused person before the Magistrate whereas Section 353 deals with the presence of the accused during the trial of the case or during enquiry. I, therefore, hold that the Magistrate had the power to entertain the application of the petitioner.

The Madhya Bharat High Court has also in Anand Martand v. Anant Pandurang, (S) AIR 1956 Madh-B. 13 taken the same view.

This Court in Mst. Savitri v. Shiv Nath, AIR 1954 J. and K. 40, held that Section 353, Cr.P.C, by necessary implication confers power on the presiding officer, whether he is a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge or a Judge of the High Court to dispense with the personal attendance of an accused. But none of these cases has discussed the effect of the provisions of Section 540-A on Section 353, Cr. P. C.

In our view Section 353, Cr. P. C. does not confer any power on Courts to grant exemption from personal attendance to an accused. In AIR 1951 All 854 IFB) it is observed that before the amendment of the Code in 1923 the Courts were exercising the power of granting exemptions in proper cases from personal attendance by accused persons. Section 540-A was enacted only to meet a special type of case and under certain special circumstances but it was not Intended that the power that the Courts were already exercising of granting exemption in cases was intended to be taken away and restricted to the provisions of Section 540-A only. The reasoning is that because before 1923 when Section 540-A did not exist in the Code general power of granting exemption from personal attendance to an accused by a Magistrate or a Judge was exercised under Section 353 in heinous offences and after the amendment of the Code when Section 540-A was introduced that general power was not taken away which is implied in the section itself. With great respect we do not agree with this view. The wording of Section 353 shows that It did not confer any power on a {Magistrate or a Judge to grant exemption to the accused from personal appearance. Prior to 1923 the Courts had been exercising power of granting exemption from personal attendance to the accused. This power was either specially given in some cases under Section 205, Cr. P. C. and in other where Section 205 did not apply might have been derived under inherent powers of the Court. But we do not see how the power of granting exemption to an accused from personal attendance can be inferred from the language of Section 353, Cr. P. C. If it is assumed that under Section 353, Cr. P. C. Courts had general power of granting exemption from personal attendance to an accused in cases which were not covered by Section 205, Cr. P. C. then it was not necessary for the Legislature to have incorporated by amendment in 1923 the provisions of Section 540-A in the Code.

It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the provisions of Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. are special provisions and deal with special cases. Our attention was drawn to Sub-section (2).of Section 540-A, Cr. P.C. and it is argued that in order to provide for splitting of a case of two or more than two accused, Section 540-A was incorporated in the Code. But this contention is not correct. It is true that sub-sec, (2) of Section 540-A provides for splitting of a case when the accused are two or more in number under certain circumstances mentioned in sub-Section (1). But all the same these two subsections of Section 540A are independent provisions and sub-Section (2) is consequential to sub-Section (1). Sub-section (1) of Section 540-A provides for a case in which there are a large number of accused and one or more of them cannot remain before the Court. In such a case the Court instead of adjourning the enquiry or trial has discretion to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and proceed with the hearing provided that such an accused is represent ed by a pleader. But sub-s. (2) of this section lays down that if such accused is not represented by a pleader the Court cannot proceed with the case and has either to adjourn it or direct that his case may be heard separately. By incorporating Section 540A in the Code the Legislature has empowered a Magistrate or a Judge at all stages of an enquiry or trial to grant exemption to an accused person from personal attendance and has placed certain limitation on granting such an exemption.

For the application of this section it is necessary that the accused should be two or more in number. The limitations on the power of a Magistrate or Judge are two-fold, namely, that the accused should be represented by a pleader and that he should be incapable of remaining before the Court. If these two conditions are satisfied the Court at any stage of the enquiry or trial can grant exemption from personal attendance to an accused in the case pending be-fore it. In face of this particular power vested in the Magistrate by the Code genera! power could not be exercised. The rule of law is firmly established that when a : statute confers upon a court specific power it cannot derive, general power by implication from another provision in the same Code. In J.. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, : (1961)ILLJ540SC it is observed:

The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions, one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier directions should have effect. In Pretty v. Solly (1859) 53 ER 1032 quoted In Craies on Statute Law at p. 206, 6th Edition) Romily, M. R. mentioned the rule thus: 'The rule Is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in us must comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.

We are clearly of the opinion that Section 353, Cr. P.C. does not contain any power expressly or impliedly, to grant exemption to an accused from personal attendance before the Court. In this view we are supported by a ruling of the Calcutta High Court reported in Kali Das Bannerji v. the State, : AIR1954Cal576 in which it is laid down that Section 353 does not confer upon a Magistrate trying a case any power to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused during the trial. in Indra Devi v. Sarnagat Singh, it has been laid down that Section 353 In itself does not empower a court to record evidence in the absence of an accused person except when his presence has been dispensed with under the other relevant provisions of the Code, namely, SSection 205 and 540-A. The Nagpur High Court in Madhav Rao v. Iswardas Sheoratan, AIR 1949 Nag 334 has taken the same view.

6. The learned Counsel for the accused argued that if there is only one accused person before a Court against whom trial is going on, neither Section 205 nor Section 540-A Cr. P. C. will apply in that case, and there will be no provision for granting exemption from personal attendance in court to such an accused person under the Code, and it is submitted that the only section under which exemption can be granted is Section 353, Cr. P. C. It is true that the case of such an accused person will not be covered either by Section 205 or by Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. In such a case the Court may, 11 circumstances Justify, adjourn the case and allow the accused to approach the High Court for grant of exemption under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. But a Magistrate or Judge, has no power to exempt the accused from personal attendance in Court under Section 353, Cr. P. C. The language of the section itself does not warrant such an Inference.

7. The next question for consideration is whether the case of the accused respondent is covered by the provisions of Section 540-A Cr. P.C. or not. It is vehemently argued on behalf of the State that the case of the accused would not fall under the provisions of the aforesaid section inasmuch as one of the conditions to be fulfilled is to show that the accused is 'incapable of remaining before the court', which according to the counsel for the State the accused has miserably failed to do. In order to determine whether the Additional Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to grant exemption to the accused from personal attendance before the Court it is necessary to find out whether the case of the accused falls within the ambit of the above section. There are two restrictions imposed upon the Court under this section on granting exemption from personal attendance to the accused, namely, that the accused should be incapable of remaining before the Court and that he should be represented by a pleader. Upon our construction of the words incapahle of remaining before the Court' must depend the jurisdiction of the Additional Sessions Judge to dispense with the attendance of the accused in Court.

The learned Counsel for the State argued that incapacity' should be construed as physical incapacity and no other reason for the absence of the accused can be taken into account in granting him exemption from personal appearance. We have carefully considered the argument of the learned Counsel and we are of the view that the words 'incapable of remaining before the Court' have to be conistrued to mean not only physical disability but incapacity due to physical or mental reasons. The word incapable' is not defined in the Code. The dictionary meaning of the word as given in Cassell's New English Dictionary, 15th Edition is not physically, intellectually, or morally capable of wanting in power, ability, or fitness unable to take care of oneself. Physical incapacity may result from various reasons other than physical disability. A man may be shocked to hear news of sudden death of his son, wife or other near and dear relation of his and he may become mentally unfit to remain before the Court. There may be a case where accused may have to attend two Courts situate at some distance from each other and he may not be able to attend one of these Courts due to reasons beyond his control and he may apply for exemption from personal appearance on the ground of incapability. In short, it is not physical ailments alone which are covered by the expression 'incapable of remaining before the Court' but other reasons also may result in rendering the accused incapable of remaining before the Court. In the instant case the accused Peer Abdul Gani had been detained in jail for a long time. He was himself unwell and was enlarged on ball on that account. He was an indoor patient In the Anantnag hospital for sometime, as is clear from the reports received by the Additional Sessions Judge from that hospital. The ground on which the last exemption from personal attendance was granted to Peer Abdul Gani was that his wife was ill and the Medical Officer, Anantnag, had submitted report in regard to the ailment of his wife. The Additional Sessions Judge has relied upon that report and has found that the wife of the accused was getting hysterical fits. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has further remarked that it is just possible that the psychological background may make the condition of the applicant's wife worse. He has further found that there was no other male member in the house of the applicant to look after his wife. Taking these aspects into consideration he has allowed exemption from personal attendance in Court to the applicant for a period of two months so that he may be able to look after his ailing wife. Such an ailment of the wife which may cause some disturbance in the mind of the accused would not by itself be sufficient to entitle him to exemption from personal appearance before the Court. The doctor's certificate does not show that the ailment is of a serious nature. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has indulged in speculations, perhaps moved on humanitarian grounds, that hysteria can result in some serious trouble but that is not the opinion which he received from the Medical Officer. It will be laying down a dangerous precedent to construe the words 'Incapable of remaining before the Court' to Include ordinary ailments of relations, however near or dear they may be, for granting exemption from personal attendance before the Court. In our opinion the view taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in granting exemption to the accused from personal attendance on the ground that he was 'Incapable of remaining before the Court' is not correct. I would have, therefore, overset his order in revision, but as the period of exemption Is very short and is going to expire very soon, I.e. on 24th March, 1963 I would not Interfere with this order. With these observations the revision applications are dismissed.

S.M. Fazl ALI, J.

8. I agree with the view taken by my lord the Chief Justice with respect to the scope and ambit of Sections 353 and 540-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and I also agree that in the circumstances of the present case, the petitions should be dismissed. I would, however, like to add a few lines of my own.

9. In these cases two main questions fall for our consideration. In the first place, the question Is as to whether a Court has power under Section 353, Cr, P. C. to exempt an accused person in a given case, and secondly as to what is the scope and ambit of Section 540-A, Cr. P, C. Section 353, Cr. P. C. runs thus:

Except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence taken under Chapters 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall be taken in the presence of the accused, or when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in presence of his pleader.

I fully agree with my lord the Chief Justice for the reasons given by him that Section 353, Cr. P. C. does not by itself confer any power on a Court to exempt an accused person. This Section merely embodies the cardinal principle of natural justice that a person should not be condemned unheard, by providing that, evidence should be taken in presence of the accused except when the accused is exempted under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is obvious that exemption contemplated by Section 353, Cr. P. C. would be granted only in exceptional circumstances as being an exception to the general rule contained in Section 353, Cr. P. C. it is therefore not reasonable to infer that the legislature gave powers to the Court to grant exemption without laying down any conditions whatsoever. If, therefore, a power was given to a Court to exempt an accused person under Section 353, Cr. p, C. without regulating the conditions or circumstances, the Courts would possess a very wide power. This does not appear to me to be the true intention of the legislature. Apart from the reasons given by my lord the Chief Justice in his judgment, this is an additional reason why we should hold that Section 353, Cr. P. C. by itself does not contain any lower to grant exemption.

In AIR 1949 Nag 334, their Lordships observed at follows:

The words used are 'when his personal attendance It dispensed with.' The conditions under which personal attendance can be dispensed with are not mentioned therein and we do not think that it confers power on Courts to dispense with personal attendance of the accused.

We respectfully agree with the observations made by their Lordships in that case.

(9a) As regards Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. apart from the reasons given by my lord the Chief Justice, there are some aspects which deserve a special consideration. Sub-clause (1) of Section 540-A, Cr. P. C, runs thus:

At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, where two or more accused are before the Court, If the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that any one or more of such accused is or are incapable of remaining before the Court, he may, If such accused is represented by a pleader dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial it. his absence and may at any subsequent stage of the proceedings direct the personal attendance of . such accused.

A perusal of Sub-section (1) of Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. shows that the Section consists of two parts. The first part gives the conditions under which this Section would apply, namely, that there must be two or more accused and that they must have appeared before the Court because the words 'remaining before the Court' implies that the accused have speared before the Court. Once these conditions apply, then Section 540-A and 540-A, Cr. P. C. alone would be the provision under which the Court can exempt an accused person. The second part consists of the restrictions laid down on the powers of a Court to grant exemption, namely, that the accused should be incapable of remaining before the Court and that the accused should, be represented by a pleader. in my opinion, these two parts have to be considered separately and should not be mixed up together. If the conditions and restrictions mentioned in Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. are mixed up together and it is held that the restrictions placed on the powers of the Court to grant exemption are also conditions necessary for the application of Section 540-A of the Code of. Criminal Procedure then it will lead to a very anomalous-position and would render the provisions of this Section nugatory. For instance when an accused person finds that he is incapable of remaining before the Court, he can by pass the provisions of this Section by inviting the Court to exercise its powers under Section 353, Cr. P. C. and. exempt him thereunder.

Thus the restrictions placed by the legislature and the statute would become meaningless and the provisions of this Section would become useless in most cases- It is a well established rule of interpretation of statutes that where the statute gives powers to a Court to be exercised within certain restrictions, there is an implied prohibition on the Court to exercise the powers beyond the restrictions mentioned in the statute. If, therefore, Section 353, Cr, P. C. be construed to contain a very wide power to grant exemption to the accused, such an interpretation would be in direct violation of this rule. In these circumstances, therefore, I am clearly of the opinion, that Section 353, Cr. P. C. would not at all apply to the cases which are covered by Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. even if it be assumed for the sake of arguments that Section 353, Cr. P. C. contains a power to exempt the accused. On an interpretation of the. plain language of Section 353, Cr. P. C. however, we have, already held that it never gave the Court power to exempt an accused person.

10. The next question to be considered is as to the meaning and the import of the words 'incapable of remaining before the Court'. I fully agree with the view expressed by my lord the Chief Justice with respect to the interpretation of the words 'incapable'. The legislature has not qualified the word 'incapable' by either physically or mentally and, therefore, it is not correct to infer that the word 'incapable' would include only such cases where a person is either physically or mentally incapable of remaining before the Court. Moreover, as we have already held that Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. is the only provision under which exemption can be granted, where there are two or more accused persons before the Court, the word 'incapable' should be construed liberally and the Section, in our opinion, would cover all cases where the accused by reason of unavoidable and unforseen circumstances and due to physical or mental disability is unable to attend the Court. It would certainly cover cases where the accused, by reason of a mental shock resulting from a sudden and serious calamity, Is stunned and stupefied so as to be incapable of pursuing the ordinary pursuits of life. Such a shock may not deprive the accused of his mental or physical faculties so as to render him incapable of attending the Court. Nevertheless, It will certainly put him in such a state of mental confusion that he will find himself unable to follow the proceedings of the Court intelligently and consciously and would, therefore, be just as much incapable of attending the Court as he would be if he was suffering from some physical disability. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule of universal application as to when an accused would be Incapable of attending the Court for this question would largely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

11. I might mention here that in the case referred to by my lord the Chief Justice, reported in , their Lordships clearly indicated that exemption under Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. could be granted for very good -reasons or on social grounds. Their Lordships gave no indication in that case that Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. was limited only to cases of physical disability. Similarly In Trilochan Misra v. State, : AIR1953Ori81 , their Lordships observed as follows:

He urged that the words 'incapable of remaining before the Court' occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 540-A, Cr. P. C. related to some sort of incapacity from attendance arising either out of illness or some other reason such as social ban or peculiar customs of the class to which the parties belong. There seems to be no doubt about the correctness of this contention....

We fully agree with the view expressed by their Lordships in the above mentioned case.

12. For the reasons given above, I agree with the judgment proposed by my lord the Chief Justice.


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