K.V. Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.
1. The applicant was convicted Under Section 123 of the Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 300 by the Addl. District Magistrate at Baramulla. He moved the District Court against his conviction and sentence and having failed to obtain redress, he has come up to this Court in revision.
2. The conviction was recorded and the sentence awarded in a summary trial under Chapter XX11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The conviction was based on the alleged admission of the applicant that he committed the offence of which he was accused and not on any evidence in the case. In his memorandum of revision, the accused person has categorically stated that he did not plead guilty in the trial court.
3. The record of the summary trial is extremely brief and in column 7 of the form prescribed Under Section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is an entry that the accused pleaded guilty. But what exactly did the accused say is not recorded anywhere.
4. The learned Counsel for the applicant has vigorously urged that the failure of the Magistrate to record the actual statement of the accused is a circumstance justifying the setting aside of the conviction and the sentence.
5. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State contends that in view of Clause (g) of Section 283 it. was not incumbent on the Magistrate to record the actual statement of the accused and that it was a sufficient conformity with the requirements of law, if he entered that the accused pleaded guilty. CI. (g) of Section 263 is as follows:
the plea of the accused and his examination (if any).
There is nothing in the words of Section 263(g) to suggest that the Magistrate need not record the words of the accused himself, but is at liberty to put down what he considers to be the result of the statement of the accused. The 'plea of the accused' will be what he actually states and not the conclusion which the Magistrate reaches after hearing his statement. Apart from this interpretation of the words occurring in Section 263(g), there are other provisions in the Code which render the contention of the learned Advocate General untenable.
6. Section 262(1) of the Code Expressly aspect that in summary trials the procedure prescribed for summons-cases shall be followed in summons-cases. The case on hand is admittedly a summons-case. Sections 24.2 and 243 of Chapter XX of the Code are, 'therefore, attracted. It is relevant to quote these Sections : Section 242 -
When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted; but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge.
If the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him; and, if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convicted him accordingly
Section 243 makes it obligatory on the Magistrate to record the admission of guilt of the accused as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused himself. This is wholly different from recording the conclusion which the Magistrate forms in respect of the statement made by the accused.
7. But then it is sought to be urged that Section 243 does not accord with Section 263(g). I am unable to agree. A true interpretation of the words of Section 263(g) does not in any way conflict with the requirements of Section 243. In view of the unambiguous provisions of Section 262, we have to read Sections 243 and 263(g) together so as to bring out a harmonious meaning.
8. The learned Advocate General relied next oil Sub-section (4) of Section 364 which says that 'nothing in Section 364 shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person Under Section 263'. This is a general provision and cannot be understood as overriding or conflicting with the special provision contained in Section 243 relating to the admission of the commission of the offence by the accused person Section 364(4) cannot, therefore, avail the respondent in this case
9. The Magistrate by not recording the alleged admission of the accused in his own words to the extent it was possible has made it impossible for this Court to ascertain whether or not the applicant really admitted his guilt. It is obviously unjust and hazardous to rely entirely upon what the Magistrate considered was the effect of the statement of the applicant and uphold his conviction and sentence, more especially when the accused stoutly denies having pleaded guilty.
10. In view of the foregoing, I allow this revision, set aside the conviction and sentence and remit the case to the trial court for re-trial.