Jaswant Singh, J.
1. This is an application under Section 561-A Cr. P.C. praying that the proceedings pending against the applicant under Section 406 R. P.C. in the Court of the Sub-Registrar, Magistrate, 1st Class, Srinagar, be quashed.
2. Shri Hira Lal Wazir, appearing in support of the application has submitted that his client has never been to Srinagar, and has never met the respondent there, that the complaint against him. is false and frivolous and that in any case the ingredients of the offence namely entrustment of the amount and its criminal misappropriation or retention or its dishonest conversion to his own use by his client are not made out. He has also drawn my attention to a few authorities but they have little bearing on the matter in question.
3. Mr. I. K. Kotwal, has on the other hand, submitted that the High Court cannot interfere with the criminal proceedings at their interlocutory stage unless the case is of an exceptional nature.
4. It is well settled that the inherent power possessed by the High Court to quash criminal proceedings is to be exercised in exceptional cases to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. In other words an order under Section 561-A Cr. P.C. should only be passed where there is a glaring defect on the face of the proceedings which makes the prosecution untenable and where there is no reasonable chance of the accused being convicted.
5. In the instant case the proceedings are still at an initial stage and it is difficult to say at this stage that the prosecution has been launched to harass the petitioner or that the ingredients of the offence are not made out.
6. The nature and scope of inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Criminal Procedure Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice was considered in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab : 1960CriLJ1239 , where the Hon'ble Gajendragadkar J. speaking for the court observed as follows:-
It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable, or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of the justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedings the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of case it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr. P.C. the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr. P.C. in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings and this is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point Vide: In Re Shripad G. Chandavarkar AIR 1928 Bom184 Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress (1899) ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab 56 Pun LR 54 : AIR. 1954 Punj 193 Nripendra Bhusan Roy v. Cobinda Bandhu Majumdar AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama Subramania ILR 47 Mad 722 : AIR 1925 Mad 39.
Keeping in view the principles deducible from the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court, I do not think it is a case in which extraordinary powers of the High Court should be used to quash the criminal proceedings at their present stage.
7. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. The observations made herein are purely for the purpose of this petition and shall not be construed by the trial magistrate as preventing him to let off the accused if after taking the evidence led in the case he comes to the conclusion that no case under Section 406 R. P.C. is made out against the applicant.