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Premchand J Panchal. Vs. Shahjahabanu Liyakatkhan Patha and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 729 of 1999; CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 732 of 1999; CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 505 of 2001.
Judge
ActsTransfer of Property Act - Sections 52(2), 43; Registration Act; Tenancy Act; Contract Act - Section 23; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Section 115
AppellantPremchand J Panchal.
RespondentShahjahabanu Liyakatkhan Patha and ors.
Appellant AdvocateMR SURESH M SHAH, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateMR JAYRAJ CHAUHAN; MR PARESH A. PATEL, Advs.
Cases ReferredYunis Ali (Dead) Thru L.Rs. v. Khursheed Akram
Excerpt:
[d. k. jain ; h. l. dattu, jj.] - hindu marriage act, 1955 - section 13b - divorce by mutual consent -- subsequently, in 2001, the parties filed a petition under section 13b of the act before the district court, gurgaon, for dissolution of the marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent. (b) whether the court can grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent when the consent has been withdrawn by one of the parties, and if so, under what circumstances. 13b. divorce by mutual consent. 6) admittedly, the parties had filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent expressing their desire to dissolve their marriage due to temperamental incompatibility on 17.08.2001. on the question of whether one of the parties may withdraw the consent at any time before the actual decree of.....1. civil revision application no. 729 of 1999 has been filed by the petitioner-original plaintiff for the prayer that the order passed by the learned 2nd extra assistant judge, below exh. 3 granting permission to appeal against the judgment and order passed in regular civil suit no. 248/97 by the learned civil judge (s.d.), banaskantha at annexure-a may be set aside on the grounds stated in the memo of petition, inter alia, that the learned judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the appellant-applicants were not a party at all before the trial court and therefore they have no right to file an appeal challenging the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court. it is also contended that the trial court has failed to appreciate the provisions of o. 41 r. 1 & 2 which resulted.....
Judgment:
1. Civil Revision Application No. 729 of 1999 has been filed by the petitioner-original plaintiff for the prayer that the order passed by the learned 2nd Extra Assistant Judge, below Exh. 3 granting permission to appeal against the judgment and order passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 248/97 by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Banaskantha at Annexure-A may be set aside on the grounds stated in the Memo of Petition, inter alia, that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the appellant-applicants were not a party at all before the trial court and therefore they have no right to file an appeal challenging the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court. It is also contended that the trial court has failed to appreciate the provisions of O. 41 R. 1 & 2 which resulted in miscarriage of justice. It is also contended that the lower appellate court ought to have issued notice to the present petitioner and without giving any opportunity of hearing the order is passed. It is also contended that the lower appellate court has failed to appreciate before granting such application as to whether any right is accrued to file such appeal by the applicants or not.

2. Civil Revision Application No. 732 of 1999 is filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order passed below Exh. 1 condoning the delay in filing Misc. Civil Application No. 91/98 by the learned Extra Assistant Judge.

3. Civil Revision Application No. 505 of 1999 is also filed challenging the order passed by the court below in execution application on the ground stated in the petition that the lower appellate court has exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it in dismissing the petitioner's application, Execution Application No. 32 of 2000. It is also contended that the court has erred in finding that the provisions of lies pen dens contained in sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act though admittedly the sale was made pending the suit and it will have application, it has not been considered.

4. Learned counsel Mr. S.M. Shah appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the plaintiff has purchased the suit land pending the litigation as stated in detail in Execution Application No. 32 of 2000. He submitted that some of the original defendants have sold different portions of land to the present respondents. Therefore, they are claiming right in the suit land as a transferee in place of the original defendants. He submitted that the provisions of sec. 52 of the T.P. Act would be attracted. He submitted that though they were not a party to the suit originally, an application was filed before the lower appellate court which was granted by the lower appellate court erroneously without considering the nature of right or interest of the applicant as to whether any right has accrued in their favour.

5. Learned counsel Mr. Shah submitted that as per the provisions of sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'the T.P. Act'), the principles of lies pen dens would apply if any property is transferred or purchased pending the litigation before the court. Learned counsel Mr. Shah submitted that it is not necessary to issue any notice to the party or serve and register under the Registration Act any such notice. Learned counsel Mr. Shah submitted that the court is required to consider the provisions of sec. 52 of T.P. Act which provide as under :

"52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto:- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit of proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose."

He submitted that during the pendency in any court any suit or proceeding, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise be dealt by any party to the suit or the proceedings so as to affect the right of the other party thereto.

6. Learned counsel Mr. Shah referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1996) 5 SCC 539 in the case of Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh and ors., and submitted that this very point with reference to the application of doctrine of lies pen dens and sec. 52 of T.P. Act has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court and it has been observed in para 6 that "the defendants were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court."

7. Learned counsel Mr. Shah has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy & Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1332, and submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the aspect of impleadment of party transferee pending the suit and specific performance of an agreement to sell and it has been observed that the doctrine of lies pen dens would apply. Learned counsel Mr. Shah strenuously submitted that as observed in this judgment,

"The principle of lies pen dens embodied in sec. 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 528 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject-mater of the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court."

8. Learned counsel Mr. Shah has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi and ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 414(1), and submitted that it has also been considered in the later judgment.

9. Learned counsel Mr. Shah has also referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in (2008) 19 GHJ (535) in the case of Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (D) by Lrs & ors. .

10. Therefore, Learned counsel Mr. Shah submitted that the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court allowing the application filed by the respondents-applicants may be set aside.

11. Learned advocate Mr Jayraj Chauhan with learned advocate Mr. Paresh Patel for the respondents has submitted that the doctrine of lies pen dens will not apply to the facts of the present case. He submitted that the judgment reported in AIR 1985 Gujarat 184 in the case of Kanbi Vaju Vasta, Boatad v. Kanbi Popat Vasta and anr., will not apply as there is a State amendment in the Transfer of Property Act. He pointedly referred to the amendment and submitted that it will not have any application in view of the amendment as there was no notice issued. He has also submitted hat it was an agricultural land and there could not be any sale of the agricultural land without permission under the Tenancy Act. He submitted that sec. 23 of the Contract Act would also be attracted as agricultural land would get converted into non-agricultural land after following the procedure and getting the permission. He therefore submitted that the respondents herein are the bona fide purchasers who have purchased without any knowledge about the pending litigation.

12. Learned advocate Mr. Chauhan has also referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of Dipakbhai Manilal Patel & anr. v. State of Gujarat & anr., reported in 2007 (2) GLR 1297, and submitted that as observed in this judgment, in view of the amendment made in sec. 52 by Bombay Act 14 of 1939 read with Act No. 57 of 1959, notice would be necessary and if such notice is not issued or registered before the Sub-Registrar, then the transferee, who is a bona fide purchaser pending the litigation, would not be affected and sec. 52 of the T.P. Act, therefore, referring to the doctrine of lies pen dens, would not apply. He pointedly referred to the observations in Para 4 as under :

"Whenever the suit pertaining to immovable property is filed, the provisions of Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable on the principles of lies pen dens in normal circumstances. However, so far as Gujarat State is concerned, there is amendment by Bombay Act No. 14 of 1939 read with Act No. 57 of 1959, whereby the notice of pendency of suit or the proceedings are required to be registered. Section 52 of the Act read with Amendment Act No. IV of 1882 for Gujarat State and Maharashtra reads as under:

"52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto:- During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit of proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under the decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose."

13. Referring to the State Amendment applicable, he has submitted that notice is required. He submitted that as observed therein, the purpose of amendment is to see that any person who may be interested in purchasing the property when he undertakes the title search he may be put to the guard that the suit is pending and he may not be misguided. Therefore, learned advocate Mr. Chauhan submitted that the provisions of sec. 52 will not have any application.

14. Learned advocate Mr. Chauhan has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Om Wati Gaur and ors. v. Jitendra Kumar and ors., reported in AIR 2003 SC 229.

15. In rejoinder, learned counsel Mr. Shah reiterated the submission about the applicability of the doctrine of lies pen dens in view of sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. He has also submitted that the submission that notice is required to be issued, which is required to be registered with the Sub-Registrar, would not apply even after the State Amendment. He submitted that the submission is misconceived in view of the specific observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1965 SC 414 in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji's Pedhi and ors., wherein in Para 37 & 38 it has been clarified that Amendment Act No. 57 of 1959 will have application in respect of the immovable property situated in Greater Bombay area only. Learned counsel Mr. Shah submitted that for the other provinces it has been provided that it may be extended by provincial government by a notification, and no such notification has been issued as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in this judgment which is with regard to the property situated in Ahmedabad. Therefore, as it has not been extended, the Amendment will not have any application and Sec. 52 of the T.P. Act will apply with full force.

16. Learned counsel Mr. Shah has also submitted that the respondents have purchased the property pending the litigation/suit and the decree of which is challenged, but there is no such permission of any court and therefore it could not have been permitted as the respondents were not a party to the suit. Therefore, the application which has been allowed by the lower appellate court is erroneous. He submitted that the respondents would be bound by the transactions and if they have purchased the property pending litigation without any permission, it would also apply and it is in these circumstances, to avoid such situation, the provision has been made in the T.P. Act and sec. 52 which bars the transaction of the property pending the litigation. He therefore submitted that the provisions of sec. 52 of the T.P. Act would be applicable and if the doctrine of lis pendens is not made applicable, it would not be in conformity with the object underlying the provisions of the T.P. Act.

17. He therefore submitted sec. 52 of the T.P. Act will fully apply and it will be binding to all subsequent transactions and it cannot be said that the subsequent purchaser, like the respondents, are bona fide purchasers. He submitted that, therefore, the respondents are neither a necessary nor a proper party and the permission granted is erroneous. Learned counsel Mr. Shah also submitted that the day on which the State of Gujarat was formed, the situation as prevailing at the time would apply and no notification has been issued and therefore the submission based on the Bombay Act No. 14 of 1939 read with Act No. 57 of 1959 will not have any application which has also been construed and interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. (supra).

18. Again, learned counsel Mr. Shah referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1996 SC 135 in the case of Surjit Singh and ors., v. Harbans Singh and ors. and submitted as to what would be the position and submitted that as observed in para 4, in spite of the orders of the trial court when the transaction was made, the court has observed that the assignee cannot claim to be imp leaded as a party on the basis of assignment. He submitted that in the same way when the suit was pending and injunction was operating, the transaction could not have taken place and the persons like the respondents who claim to be purchasers pending litigation cannot make any application for being joined as party for pursuing the appeal as a bona fide purchaser. He submitted that in such a situation, as observed even in this judgment, the doctrine of lies pen dens would apply which is provided in sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. He therefore submitted that it will apply with full force and the submissions made by the other side referring to the amendment that the doctrine of lies pen dens will not have any application may not be accepted.

19. Learned advocate Mr. Chauhan submitted that considering the scope of revision jurisdiction, the court may not entertain the present revision application. He submitted that it is well settled that even if the other view is possible which is not erroneous, the court would not interfere unless it can be shown that the order is perverse resulting in miscarriage of justice. He therefore submitted that the present revision application may not be entertained.

20. In view of rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the provisions of sec. 52 of the T.P. Act would be attracted and the doctrine of lies pen dens would apply to the facts of the present case.

21. For the purpose of appreciating this aspect, a few facts which have been narrated hereinabove are required to be considered that there was an agreement to sell and subsequently the plaintiff, the present petitioner, filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement. However, as the necessary permission for N.A. could not be obtained and the transaction could not be finalised for want of permission under the Tenancy Act which led to filing of the suit for specific performance. However, during the pendency of the litigation, the property in question came to be sold to the respondents. Therefore, the present revision application has been filed by the petitioner invoking the doctrine of lies pen dens referred to in sec. 52 of the T.P. Act. At the same time, it is not in dispute that no notice has been published. The bone of contention, whether sec. 52 of the T.P. Act would apply and the doctrine of lies pen dens would be applicable, is required to be considered.

22. A useful reference can be made to the Transfer of Property (Bombay Provision for Uniformity and Amendment) Act, 1959 where it has been provided,

"AND WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for uniformity in the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882) in its application to the entire State of Bombay and to repeal the Acts mentioned in the preceding paragraph."

Clause 3 of the said Act provide,

"Extension of certain provisions of Bom. XIV of 1939 to rest of State."

23. This would, therefore, imply that the provisions of the T.P. Act read with the Indian Registration Act are applicable in the State of Gujarat as it was forming part of the erstwhile State of Bombay at the relevant time in 1959.

24. Moreover, the Transfer of Property and the Indian Registration (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1939 has reference to the necessity for registration as it has been stated in the Object,

"Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that during the pendency in a Court of a suit and proceeding in which a right to immovable property is in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other parties thereto. There is no provision, however, in that Act providing for compulsory registration or giving notice of the pending suit or action by the party claiming benefit under this section. The result is that many bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration suffer loss for want of notice that the properties purchased by them had been included in a pending action. The Bill is intended to supplement the provisions of section 52 and make the registration of lis pendens a condition precedent to the operation of the provisions thereof. It is intended that the law should in the first instance extend to the City of Bombay only. The amendment of the Registration Act is only consequential."

25. Therefore, in light of these provisions, the submissions made by learned counsel Mr. Shah based on sec. 52 of the T.P. Act cannot be accepted. As discussed above, there is no dispute with regard to the provisions of sec. 52 which bars transaction of property during the pendency of the litigation. At the same time, in order to avoid any hardship, subsequent state amendments as discussed hereinabove have been made obliging the issuance of notice and registration thereof under the Registration Act. Though the submissions have been made by learned counsel Mr. Shah that there is no such notification by which it can be said such amendment is applicable to the facts of the case and it was confined to a particular area in the erstwhile Bombay State cannot be accepted in light of the discussion made hereinabove.

26. It is also required to be noted at this stage that in a judgment in the case of Dipakbhai Manilal Patel & anr. (supra), this Court had an occasion to deal with similar issue with regard to registration and notice and the applicability of the State Amendment to the T.P. Act to the State of Gujarat and in Para 5 it has been specifically observed,

"if the notice of lies pen dens is registered under the Registration Act and as per the provisions of the amendment, the notice of pendency of the suit should contain all the details as per sub-sec. (2) of the Amendment in Sec. 52 which is applicable to the State of Gujarat. The essential purpose of the aforesaid amendment is to see that any person who may be interested to purchase the property when undertakes the title search of the property with the Sub-Registrar, the person concerned would be put to the notice that a particular suit is pending before the competent Court and therefore he may not be misguided or if with conscious knowledge the person concerned has purchased the property, the purchaser may not be in a position to contend that he was not aware about the pendency of the litigation, and consequently, the suit may not be frustrated or the principles of lies pen dens can have its full effect as per the provisions of Transfer of Property Act."

27. It is required to be also noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. (supra) referred to and relied upon by learned counsel Mr. Shah, there is a discussion on this aspect in Para 39 with regard to Transfer of Property (Bombay Provision for Uniformity and Amendment) Act, 1959, wherein the applicability of the Act in order to maintain uniformity has been considered and it has been observed that notwithstanding the formation of the new State, the territorial extent of laws previously in operation would continue to apply for the purpose of uniformity.

28. It is also required to be mentioned that as per the General Clauses Act, 1884, the laws, rules, regulations in force applicable to the State of Bombay will continue to have its application to the said areas which were forming part of the State of Bombay at the relevant time even after the formation of the State of Gujarat.

29. The reliance placed by learned counsel Mr. Shah on the judgment in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. (supra) with specific observation referring to the fact that in that litigation the property was in Ahmedabad and it was held that the amendment would not have any application as the notification has not been issued is required to be considered in light of the fact about the subsequent development. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Anand Nivas Private Ltd. (supra) relates to the transaction which had taken place much prior thereto, whereas in the facts of the present case, the transaction had taken place subsequently. At the same time, there is no notification brought on record by either side with regard to the applicability of the amendment in the State.

30. There is nothing on record to show that the respondents had the knowledge at the time when they purchased the property pending the litigation. Therefore, the reliance placed by learned counsel Mr. Shah on the judgment in the case of Surjit Singh & ors. (supra) referring to the assignment pending the litigation and claim made by the assignee to be imp leaded as a party on the basis of the assignment was not accepted, is required to be considered. It has been specifically observed referring to the facts of the case regarding defiance of the order as under :

"The Court, in these circumstances has the duty, as also the right, to treat the alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all for its purpose. Once that is so, Pritam Singh and his assignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be imp leaded as parties on the basis of assignment. Therefore, the assignees-respondents could not have been imp leaded by the trial Court as parties to the suit, in disobedience of its orders. The principles of lies pen dens are altogether on a different footing. We do not propose to examine their involvement presently."

Therefore, this judgment would not be construed as laying down any such proposition as canvassed by learned counsel Mr. Shah.

31. Similarly, the judgment in the case of Sarvinder Singh (supra), again referring to the aspect of lies pen dens and alienation pending litigation whether it would be hit by the doctrine of lies pen dens under sec. 52 of the T.P. Act was considered and the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, which has been much emphasised by learned counsel Mr. Shah referring to sec. 52 of the T.P. Act that "the property could not have been transferred or dealt with in any way affecting the rights of the parties except with the order or authority of the Court." Admittedly, the order or authority has not been obtained for alienation of the property. Therefore, the moot question which is required to be considered is whether the transaction which has taken place would be hit by the doctrine of lies pen dens or operation of sec. 52 of T.P. Act while considering the submissions made by the respondents about the bona fide purchaser having purchased without even knowledge about such litigation and admittedly when there is no such notice as required under the Registration Act having been published.

32. Therefore, even if the submission of learned counsel Mr. Shah is accepted to the extent that notice or registration of such notice about pendency of the litigation is not necessary and the doctrine of lies pen dens under sec. 52 of T.P. Act would be applicable, still, it will have to be considered while deciding the submissions based on doctrine of lies pen dens as to whether there is any absolute right or whether the courts have to consider the facts and the equities.

33. Thus, though the notification has not been brought on record, it implies that the Statement Amendments are applicable to the State of Gujarat and the transaction entered into after such amendments will require publication of notice of lis pendens and also registration under the Registration Act. Therefore, merely because the notification is not produced, the submission made by learned counsel Mr. Shah that it is not required cannot be readily be accepted in light of this judgment and the observations made therein. Admittedly, no notice of lis pendens as required under the provisions of the Amendment Act has been given. It is in these circumstances the submissions are required to be appreciated for deciding the rival claims.

34. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2010) 8 Supreme 338 in the case of T.G. Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal & Anr., wherein, while considering the identical issues raised, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that lack of adequate notice to the transferee about the pending litigation resulting into undue hardship of bona fide purchaser are required to be considered and the recommendation has been made to the Law Commission. At the same time, it has also been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court referring to sec. 52 of T.P. Act and the lies pendent late that it does not render such transfer void or illegal nor does it defeat any just and equitable claim of transferee but it only binds the transferee by the outcome of the pending litigation. A reference has been made to the earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2007) 2 SCC 404 in the case of Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (dead) by Lrs., where it has been observed that sec. 52 only binds the purchaser during the pendency of the suit and sec. 52 need not operate to render the transaction void. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this judgment referring to the provisions of sec. 43 has observed that it refers to the rule of feeding the estoppels and has further observed as to what are the requirements to be fulfilled. In para 18 of the said judgment referring to sec. 52 it has been stated that it merely prohibits a transfer and it does not state that it would result in an illegality. Only the purchaser during the pendency of a suit would be bound by the result of the litigation and the transaction was not rendered void.

35. It is in this background the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court granting the application, though the respondents who have stepped in the shoes of the original vendor, is required to be considered. The lower appellate court while granting the application has permitted the respondents to step in the shoes of the vendor and, still, the right of the petitioner is not affected as he has claimed specific performance of the original contract which, if established, the respondents would be bound as successor of the original vendor. On the other hand, if the application is not granted, the respondents bona fide purchasers without notice would not even have an opportunity to contest that specific performance could not be claimed in place of his predecessor in title (the transferor). Therefore, wile considering the equities also, the application which has been granted would balance the rival claims leaving it open to be decided with regard to the specific performance of the contract which is claimed by the petitioner herein and ultimately if he succeeds, the respondents who are transferees will be bound by the claim which the predecessor in title (transferor) had created as he would be stepping in the shoes of the transferor.

36. It is in these circumstances while exercising revision jurisdiction under sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure it is required to be considered whether it would call for exercise of such discretion and whether the order passed by the lower appellate court can be said to be perverse resulting in miscarriage of justice.

37. As discussed hereinabove, by allowing such application, the rights of the petitioner are not affected to pursue the remedy with regard to specific performance of the contract and therefore no prejudice can be said to have been caused. Therefore, it would not be proper to interfere with the impugned judgment and order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the scope of which is limited as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court by way of guidelines in catena of judicial pronouncements including the observations made in a judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 2607 in the case of Yunis Ali (Dead) Thru L.Rs. v. Khursheed Akram, wherein it has been observed,

"The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revision jurisdiction."

38. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court does not call for any interference and all these Revision Applications deserve to be rejected and accordingly stand rejected. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.


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