LORD ATKIN. The question which arises in this case is whether there was or was not a valid gift by the will of the testatrix, which was made on August 16, 1933. After giving certain legacies, she made the following residuary gifts: she directed that her trustees were "to stand possessed of the residue upon trust in equal shares for St. Clement's Mission, Notting Dale (of which my uncle Edmund Waller was founder and which he and I have supported) for their mission work, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, the Vicar and Churchwardens of St. Columba's Church, Hoxton (for parish work), and the Vicar and Churchwardens of St. Cuthbert's Church, Philbeach Gardens, Kensington (for parish work)." The question is whether the last two gifts are valid, or whether they are not too vague as going beyond what is within the meaning of the law a charitable gift. If they go beyond the legal definition of a charitable gift, they are too vague. The principle has been expressed, perhaps as well as it could be expressed, by Lord Macnaghten in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Dunne v. Byrne  A. C. 407). In that case the gift was expressed in these words: "I will and bequeath .... that the residue of my estate should be handed to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane and his successors to be used and expended wholly or in part as such Archbishop may judge most conducive to the good of religion in this diocese," and it was held that that was not a good charitable bequest and was void. I do not quote the case at all because of the terms of that bequest, but because of what was said in the judgment  A. C. 411): "The language of the bequest (to use Lord Langdale's words) would be 'open to such latitude of construction as to raise no trust which a Court of Equity could carry into execution,'" and for that, Lord Macnaghten quotes the case of Baker v. Sutton (1836) 1 Keen, 224, 233). Lord Macnaghten continues: "If the property, as Sir William Grant said in James v. Allen (1817) 3 Mer. 17) 'might consistently with the will be applied to other than strictly charitable purposes, the trust is too indefinite for the Court to execute.'"
The question is, what is the meaning of the words "the Vicar and Churchwardens of St. Columba's Church, Hoxton (for parish work)"? Mr. Vaisey, in the course of a forcible argument on behalf of the appellants, said that that is just equivalent to a gift to the vicar and churchwardens of St. Columba's Church, Hoxton - it is in fact in Haggerston, but we need not trouble about that - and he says that that would mean a gift to the vicar and churchwardens for the purpose of their spiritual duties as vicar and churchwardens, and that it would be a good charitable bequest - and that is perfectly true - if there were no words added. Then he says that the words "(for parish work)" simply mean to express what would be implicit in the words "the Vicar and Churchwardens" without the addition of those words in brackets; and, if so, he says, there is nothing to prevent this gift from being a charitable gift; or, he says, the words limit their duties in some particular respect which I do not think he found it very easy to define, and which, if he finds it difficult, I find it still more difficult to define; but in some sense or other he says that the words limit what would be ordinarily understood if you had a gift to the vicar and churchwardens simply.
My Lords, it seems to me that that is quite sufficient to dispose of this case. I find myself quite unable to disagree with the views taken by Luxmoore J., by the Master of the Rolls, and by Farwell J. I am sorry not to be able to accept the view taken by Clauson L.J., but I think it would be too narrow a view, upon these words. I share the regret which has been expressed by all the judges in coming to this conclusion.
I think that this case is a warning to those persons who desire to make wills with a benevolent intention, giving legacies for charitable purposes in the broad sense of the word, that they should make it clear that their objects are within the legal definition of charity, and are certain. But the law has been the law now for a very great number of years, and it is quite plain to my mind that words of such general import as these are suggest an uncertainty of purpose which it is quite impossible to bring within the purview of the law of trusts.
I am of opinion, therefore, that this appeal should be dismissed. It is a case which has given rise to judicial doubt, and which I think it was very proper for the persons representing these parishes to bring to a decision in this House. I notice that there was a condition made on giving leave to appeal that there should be no opposition offered to a suggestion that the costs should come out of the two bequests which fail. Of course, we are not bound by that condition, but it appears to me to be one which it would be quite proper to make, and in those circumstances I propose to your Lordships that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the costs should come out of the two funds in question.
I find myself in complete agreement with the judgments delivered by the Master of the Rolls and by Farwell J., and I would accordingly dismiss this appeal, but with the provision as to costs which has been referred to by the noble Lord on the Woolsack.