Court : Kolkata
Decided on : Jun-11-1934
Reported in : AIR1935Cal228
..... case of estoppel can arise as the plaintiff does not claim the estate through his father. mr. ghose contended that what the father was really doing was to make a contract for the benefit of his minor son, who is therefore bound by it. there can be no question that the son was benefited by it. this aspect of the matter .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Decided on : Aug-17-1934
Reported in : AIR1935Mad51; 153Ind.Cas.476; (1935)68MLJ51
order1. the question of the effect of rule 2 of the agency rules of 1924 has been argued before us. mr. rama rao lays stress upon the fact that this rule reproduces only some of the provisions of order 33 and order 44, civil procedure code while other provisions are not re-produced and contends that as the civil procedure code is not applicable to the agency tracts, we ought not, in dealing with this case, be guided by the provision in order 44 of the code, which enables the high court to refuse leave to appeal in forma pauperis, unless upon a perusal of the judgment and decree appealed from it sees reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust. he also 3raws our attention to the fact that in the case of appeals from the agent, there is no provision corresponding to order 41, rule 11, civil procedure code. as regards the usage of the word 'may' in rule 2 of the agency rules he invokes the well established doctrine that in particular contexts, the word 'may' must be understood as importing an obligation and contends that the court is bound to exercise in favour of paupers the privilege intended to be conferred upon them by rule 2. he maintains that under the rules, the appeal must be admitted as a matter of course and no leave of court is necessary at all. we are unable to accede to his contention that this court ought not to take into consideration the merits of the case at all, in dealing with .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Decided on : Oct-29-1934
Reported in : AIR1935Mad404
..... be contended that the 1st defendant would be entitled to a charge if he did not care or had not been ready to carry out the contract between sadagopa and shanmuga. as we have already indicated, it is clear from the correspondence that, from september 1921, shanmuga had been insisting that ..... was prepared to concur in that line of reasoning. there was also this additional circumstance in that case, viz., a subsequent registered conveyance by the contracting party in favour of the original promise who was also in possession : and the judgment of sreenivasa aiyangar, j., is to some extent based upon ..... defence to the claim in ejectment, he could at best only apply for stay of the ejectment suit till he obtained specific performance of his contract in appropriate proceedings. in this state of the law, it must be held that neither satagopa nor the official assignee became the owner of schedule ..... conveyance not only of the legal title (which in one view was considered to have vested in sadagopa already) but also the benefit of the contract of the insolvent with shanmuga mudali. though defendant 1 obtained this transfer on 27th march 19/5 he has taken no further steps to obtain ..... counsel, offered to take a conveyance from the official assignee (as representing sadagopa's estate) of the schedule a properties and the benefit of the contract between sadagopa and shanmuga for the conveyance thereof the official assignee executed ex. 23 to defendant 1. it must be mentioned in passing that ex. .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Sep-06-1934
Reported in : AIR1935All99; 152Ind.Cas.384
1. a preliminary objection is taken to this application for leave to appeal to his majesty in council that it is barred by time. judgment in this case was pronounced by the high court on 23rd january 1934, and a decree was prepared later on. an application for a copy of the decree was filed on 28th april 1934, and the copy was ready for delivery on 16th may 1934. this application for leave to appeal was filed on 21st july 1934. it is therefore obvious that if the time required for obtaining of the decree be not excluded from the period of limitation prescribed for such applications, the application is beyond time. indeed the time expired before the long vacation commenced, and therefore the applicant is not entitled to add to that period the period of the long vacation.2. the learned advocate for the applicants contends before us that under section 12(3), limitation act, he is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment also in addition to the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. he has to concede that there is a ruling of this court in wilayati begam v. jhandu mal-muhu la 1926 all. 286, which is directly against him. but he urges before us that the patna high court and the madras high court have taken a contrary view and that therefore the matter may be referred to a higher bench.3. in mahabir prasad tiwari v. jamuna singh 1922 pat. 255, dawson miller, c.j., of the patna high court in delivering he judgment of the court in which .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Decided on : Sep-13-1934
Reported in : AIR1935Mad113; 153Ind.Cas.668
..... agreement of release is after the purchase, for in such a case the purchaser would be a representative of the mortgagor. but in the present case the contract to release half of the property was prior to ex. 1.5. in such a case there is no legal difficulty in the way of holding ..... also be registered under the registration act. but where the contract to release is not between a mortgagor and a mortgagee but between a mortgagee and a stranger as in this case, neither the; transfer of property act ..... a. no. 797 of 1921, that there is no law in india whereby a release of mortgage should be in writing and registered. if there is a contract of release between a mortgagor and a mortgagee it may be that under section 92(4), evidence act, it should be in writing and then it should ..... mortgagees accepted the amount and at the time of the acceptance they did not show by their conduct that they wished to resile or go behind the contract already made. the only meaning that could be attributed to the acceptance of the amount is that they thereby released the property from the mortgage. if ..... 625 in discharge of another unsecured debt due by the mortgagor to the mortgagees. we think this evidence shows that there was a binding contract between the parties, the effect of the contract being that if the purchaser paid down the amount to the mortgagees they should give him a release. afterwards, when the amount was .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : US Supreme Court
Decided on : May-21-1934
..... neither our judgment nor that of the state court operates directly upon the contract by destroying its obligation. the measure page 292 u. s. 415 of judicial power, in the absence of the affiliated sellers, is the determination ..... is determined with finality by the appointed officers of the state. the only question for us in these intercorporate relations is whether the rejection of the contract as a measure of the appellant's operating expenses was a wholly arbitrary act, and thus equivalent in its effect to an act of confiscation. ..... the river price remains inadequate after adding the excluded items for depreciation and depletion, and that the price should be fixed in accordance with the contract. there is nothing to show that the supreme court of ohio held itself bound by the determination of the west virginia commission, or failed to ..... expenses, which, in turn, necessitated an inquiry into the property and expenses of its affiliated corporations. until sometime in 1929, there had been a contract between the columbus company and the ohio fuel gas company whereby, for gas delivered at the city gateway, columbus was to pay to ohio 65 ..... in fixing the rates of a distributing gas company, a state is not bound by the price at which that company purchases its gas supply under a contract with an affiliated gas producing company if it is higher than a fair return to the seller. dayton power & light co. v. public utilities .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : US Supreme Court
Decided on : Mar-05-1934
..... the name, controls. the insurer is not penalized for taking the controversy into court. it is penalized (if penalty there is) for refusing to make payment in accordance with its contract, and penalized in an amount that bears a reasonable proportion to the loss or inconvenience likely to be suffered by the creditor. repeated judgments of this court bear witness to ..... texas ( union cent. life ins. co. v. chowning, 86 tex. 654, 26 s.w. 982) that the 12 percent was given as damages for the failure to comply with the contract by payment, and the fee as compensation for the cost of collection. 185 u.s. at p. 185 u. s. 325 . during the half century and more in which the ..... an attorney's fee of $200 ($100 for the trial and $100 for the appeal). the other was an award of 12 percent computed on the payments due under the contract. these increments are authorized by a statute of arkansas which is quoted in the margin. [ footnote 1 ] the page 291 u. s. 569 insurer contests the validity of the statute ..... , at the delivery of the policy, the insurer was informed that, if it failed to make payment in accordance with its contract, "twelve percent damages" would be owing to the insured. we discover nothing arbitrary or oppressive in imposing such a contract upon the business of insurance, a business subject, as all agree, to control and regulation. hardware dealers mutual fire ins .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Mumbai
Decided on : Feb-21-1934
Reported in : AIR1934Bom491; (1934)36BOMLR1068
..... . the second portion would apply, and according to it time would begin to run when the plaintiffs had given notice and when the performance of the contract was refused. this could only be from october 2, 1925, when the plaintiffs demanded accounts, and the defendant failed to reply. if limitation under article ..... hand over the plaintiffs' share to them. accounts would necessarily have to be made up after that date. nor does the agreement provide that the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant was to be carried out within a fixed period from the receipt of the property and money by the defendant. ..... he may have taken from the plaintiffs' shop. if it could have been said that under the agreement there was a fixed date by which the contract between the parties was to be carried out, the case would have fallen under the first half of column 3 of article 113 of the indian ..... agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant with regard to vinayak mukund's litigation did not, however, provide any fixed date for the performance of the contract. it did not say that the plaintiffs were to be given their share on the very date on which the defendant received his share from vinayak ..... to apply, the suit appears to be in time. the article deals with suits for specific performance of contracts, and provides a limitation of three years from the date fixed for the performance of the contract, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiffs have notice that performance is refused. the .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Allahabad
Decided on : Feb-06-1934
Reported in : AIR1934All553; 150Ind.Cas.151
..... 'any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not.' we have no doubt that the word person used in section 182 and other cognate sections of the contract act, includes a joint hindu family in this view the defendants were agents not of dhyan pal singh or of the plaintiff acting individually but of the joint hindu family ..... of the years 1921 to 1923 is barred by limitation, we are of opinion that it has no force. the plea rests on the assumption that there were two successive contracts of agency, the first being entered into between dhyan pal singh and the defendants, and the second by the present plaintiff and the defendants. it is argued that so far ..... purposes. we do not think that this argument has any force. a joint hindu family has always been treated as a juristic person on whose behalf contracts can be entered into and enforced. section 182, contract act, defines the terms 'agent' and 'principal';an 'agent' is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with ..... concerned it terminated on the death of dhyan pal singh. reference is made in this connexion to section 201, contract act. the obvious fallacy on which this contention rests lies in the assumption that the contract was entered into by dhyan pal singh as an individual.6. it is not disputed that the property which was managed by the defendants belonged to .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : US Supreme Court
Decided on : Apr-02-1934
..... v. merrill mortuaries, inc., 93 mont.192, 17 p.2d 1081, the situation was the same as in the suit by berryman, supra, the applicants for the receiver being simple contract creditors suing to collect a debt. what was said as to the trust fund doctrine when invoked by a creditor so situated (49 mont. at p. 572) is in full ..... ., 44 mont. 517, 525, 121 p. 280, a temporary receiver was appointed in an action against a domestic corporation not dissolved. in aid of this appointment, the plaintiff, a simple contract creditor, alleged that the defendant was insolvent. on appeal, the court held that this, without more, did not make the appointment necessary, and vacated the receivership. in prudential securities co ..... .2d 959. the court held that the respondents' judgment had been lawfully recovered, though the defendant was dissolved; that the ancillary receivership was void for the reason that a simple contract creditor (mieyr) was without standing to maintain the suit; that clark, the foreign liquidator, was not the successor to the corporate personality with a title derived from the statutes of ..... to issue execution, the situation had been complicated by a suit for the appointment of a receiver begun in a montana district court. on march 25, 1932, mieyr, a simple contract creditor, brought suit against the surety company and clark, the foreign liquidator, praying an ancillary receivership to preserve the local assets. a temporary receiver (crichton) was appointed the same day .....Tag this Judgment!