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May 01 1893 (FN)

Richmond and Danville R. Co. Vs. Elliott

Court : US Supreme Court

Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Elliott - 149 U.S. 266 (1893) U.S. Supreme Court Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Elliott, 149 U.S. 266 (1893) Richmond and Danville Railroad Company v. Elliott No. 199 Argued April 5-6, 1893 Decided May 1, 1893 149 U.S. 266 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA Syllabus On the trial of an action by a coupler and switchman of a railroad company, whose wages were $1.50 per day, against another company to recover for injuries received while in the discharge of his duties from the explosion of the boiler of a locomotive, he was asked, as a witness, what were his prospects of advancement in the service of the company, and answered that he thought by staying he would be promoted; that he had been several times, in the absence of the yardmaster, called upon to discharge his duties; that there was a "system by which you go in there as coupler or train-hand, or in the yard, and if a man falls out, you stand a...

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May 01 1893 (FN)

United States Vs. Mock

Court : US Supreme Court

United States v. Mock - 149 U.S. 273 (1893) U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Mock, 149 U.S. 273 (1893) United States v. Mock No. 233 Submitted April 21, 1893 Decided May 1, 1893 149 U.S. 273 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus When the defendant in an action of trespass brought by the United States against him for cutting and carrying away timber from public lands admits the doing of those acts, the plaintiffs are entitled to at least nominal damages in the absence of direct evidence as to the value of the standing trees. It is not to be presumed in such case as matter of course that the government permitted the trespass, and any instruction by the court pointing that way is error. This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint on May 6, 1884, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, in which complaint it was alleged that the plaintiff was the owner, in 1879, ...

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May 01 1893 (FN)

United States Vs. Dumas

Court : US Supreme Court

United States v. Dumas - 149 U.S. 278 (1893) U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Dumas, 149 U.S. 278 (1893) United States v. Dumas No. 230 Submitted April 20, 1893 Decided May 1, 1893 149 U.S. 278 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA Syllabus An order of the Postmaster General, made in the exercise of the discretion given him by the Act of June 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 140, c. 259, 1, withholding commissions from a postmaster and allowing a stated compensation in place thereof in consequence of alleged false returns in the postmaster's accounts, is not final and conclusive in an action by the United States against the postmaster and the sureties on his bond to recover moneys alleged to be illegally withheld, but is competent evidence on the part of the government, which may be explained or contradicted by the defendants. This was an action brought by the United States to recover from Anna M. Dumas and the sureties on her official...

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Apr 27 1893 (PC)

V. Ramachandra Row and ors. Vs. Sesha Aiyangar

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1893)3MLJ225

1. It is urged on petitioner's behalf that the document sued upon is not a negotiable instrument but an instrument of pledge. It is in these terms:-' On deposit of title-deeds I promise to pay you or order Rs. 160 for value received.' The words 'or order,' show that the intention was that the promissory note should circulate from hand to hand, and the question therefore is whether the terms, 'on deposit of title-deeds,' control its operation and restrain its negotiability. Deposit of title-deeds as a collateral security does not make a promissory note the less a negotiable instrument, and it was held in Wise v. Charlton, 4 Ad & E 790 Do the words, 'on deposit of title-deeds,' import in the case before us more than a collateral security is also given or in any way restrain the operation of the promissory note as a negotiable instrument? We do not think that an allusion to the mere deposit of title-deeds makes the payment contingent or otherwise qualifies the operation of the document as...

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Apr 27 1893 (PC)

Ramachandra and ors. Vs. Sesha

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1894)ILR17Mad86

1. It is urged on petitioners' behalf that the document sued upon is not a negotiable instrument but an instrument of pledge. It is in these terms: 'On deposit of title-deeds I promise to pay you or order Rs. 160 for value received.' The words 'or order, 'show that the intention was that the promissory note should circulate from hand to hand, and the question therefore is, whether the terms ' on deposit of title-deeds ' control its operation and restrain its negotiability. Deposit of title-deeds as a collateral security does not make a promissory note the less a negotiable instrument, and it was so held in Wise v. Charlton 4 Ad. & E. 790 Do the words 'on deposit of title-deeds,' import in the case before us more than that a collateral security is also given, or in any way restrain the operation of the promissory note as a negotiable instrument? We do not think an allusion to the mere deposit of title-deeds makes the payment contingent or otherwise qualifies the operation of the documen...

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Apr 26 1893 (PC)

Siriparapu Ramanna and ors. Vs. Sreemantu Raja Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna ...

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1893)3MLJ207

1. This is a second appeal from the decree of the District Judge of Kistna, disallowing appellant's claim with costs. Respondent is the Zamindar of Devarakota and appellant is a jirayati ryot in his Zamindari. A patta was tendered for Fasli 1297 by the former, but the latter refused to accept it. The Zamindar then distrained the ryot's property for arrears of rent which he claimed for 1297 and the tenant sued to set aside the distraint as being illegal. The question for determination was whether the patta tendered, Exh. I, was one which appellant was bound to accept and the requirement of Section 7, Act VIII of 1865, was thereby complied with. Appellant objected to two items in Exh. I, viz, the rate of Rupees 9 annas 8 per acre charged on dry land irrigated under the Kistna anicut and the fee entered as payable to a temple at Sivaganga, The Special Assistant Collector considered that the consolidated wet assessment of Rs. 9-8-0 per acre was too high and that the usual dry rate of Rs 2-...

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Apr 26 1893 (PC)

Mallikarjuna Prasad Nayudu Vs. Lakshminarayana

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1894)ILR17Mad50

1. These second appeals arise from suits brought by the receiver of the Devarakota estate to enforce the acceptance of. pattas for fasli 1298 by raiyats in the jirayati village of Nidumole. The raiyats objected to three items in the pattas tendered to them, viz., Nayakvadi fees, tax on palmyra trees, and consolidated wet rates imposed on lands irrigated by the anicut channels from the Kistna. As regards the first two items, both the Courts below decided in favour of the zamindar, and the raiyats have not appealed from their decision. As for the wet rate, it is conceded no sanction has boon obtained from the Collector as required by the first proviso to Section 11, Act VIII of 1865; but it is contended that such sanction was not necessary, and that, even if necessary, it must be taken to have been accorded, the wet rates being inserted in the pattas under the orders of the Collector, who was the receiver. The first proviso to Section 11 expressly prescribes the sanction, of the Collecto...

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Apr 26 1893 (PC)

Lakshmana Vs. Appa Rau

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1894)ILR17Mad73

1. These second appeals relate to suits brought by the zamindar of Nuzvid to compel the raiyats in the village of Kuyur to accept pattas for fasli 1297. The raiyats are the appellants and the zamindar is the respondent before us. The items in the pattas to which appellants object in second appeal are (i) the consolidated wet rate; (ii) the fees to village artisans : Oil) the tax on trees; (iv) the condition that no land should be cultivated without first obtaining a patta; (v) that no building should be erected on lands in appellant's possession; (vi) that no remissions are to be allowed, and (vii) that interest shall be paid on instalments of rent from the dates on which they fall due according to the kistbundi.2. The first item is the most important and the history of the rates which prevailed in the village from fasli 1265 is given by the 'Head Assistant Collector in his judgment. It will be observed that the sharing system was in force till fasli 1264, that the money rates varied f...

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Apr 26 1893 (PC)

Ramjan Ali and anr. Vs. Amjad Ali

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1893)ILR20Cal903

Macpherson and Banerjee, JJ.1. The only question raised in this case is whether Section 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a bar to the suit.2. It appears that in October 1890 the Government made an order, under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for a record of rights and settlement of rents in the part of the country in which this land lies. The present suit was brought in April 1891 to recover rent due for the Maji years 1249, 1250, and 1251, corresponding with the years 1887 to 1889 A.D. The plaintiff claims under the terms of a kabuliat which provides that if it is found that the defendant holds land in excess of the area specified in the kabuliat, he shall pay excess rent at a stipulated rate. It is urged in the present case that a measurement was made previous to the time for which rent is claimed, that excess land was found, and that the defendant is liable to pay the additional rent claimed.3. The Lower Appellate Court has held that the suit cannot be maintained without a viol...

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Apr 25 1893 (PC)

Aukella Vydianatham Vs. Kuncham Gangarazu

Court : Chennai

Reported in : (1893)3MLJ132

Muthusami Aiyar, J.1. The question for determination in this case is whether the contract sued on is a marriage brokerage contract and if so whether it is valid. There is no reason to think that the contract in question is not a contract as found by the court below to assist the defendant for reward in procuring a wife. The point which the question then comes to is whether the rule of public policy which invalidates marriage brokerage contracts in England is applicable to the case before us. The reason of that rule as stated in Hall v Thynne Show, P. C. 76, which went to the House of Lords is that it is conducive to public good that marriages should be procured and promoted by the mediation of relatives and friends and not by hirelings. On principle this rule appears to be of general application and not of a special or conventional character. Is there anything then in the usage of this country to preclude its operation? As far as I am aware there is nothing to the contrary. On the othe...

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