Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1884)ILR10Cal1095
mitter and pigot, jj.1. these appeals arise out of suits instituted by the plaintiff, who is the lessor of the mouzah in which the lands in suit are situated, to eject the defendants from their holdings.2. amongst other pleas, the defendants pleaded want of sufficient notice, and set up their right of occupancy in bar of the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. as regards the notice, the admitted facts are these: the notice itself is dated 19th bysack 1288, corresponding with the 3rd may 1881. the notice informed the ryot that he was to quit his holding within seven days. it was served on the ryot on the 23rd bysack 1288, corresponding with the 7th of may 1881, and the present suits were brought on the 13th of may 1881, that is to say, one day before the term given in the notice expired. upon both these points issues were framed by the munsif, who came to the conclusion that the defendant's plea, as regards the insufficiency of notice, was fully made out, but the munsif's finding was against the defendants, the ryots, upon the other issue, vis., as to whether or not they had acquired a right of occupancy. the munsif upon his findings dismissed the plaintiff's suit. it is quite clear that the order of dismissal is based upon his finding upon the question of notice. against that decree the ryots (defendants) appealed, and the subordinate judge on appeal has affirmed the decision and the decree of the lower court. one of the points raised before the subordinate judge was that it was .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ251
1. in this. case the plaintiff, the holder of a permanently settled estate, seeks, among other things, to eject the defendant from certain lands. admittedly, the lands are situated within the plaintiff's estate and are subject to an annual' assessment payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.2. the decision of the case depends solely upon these facts, no other facts having been satisfactorily established by the evidence.3. in this state of the case the lower appellate court dismissed the suit in so for as the prayer far possession was concerned. on behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that the dismfssal was erroneous and that the error was caused by the lower appellate court having wrongly thrown the onus of proof on the plaintiff. the argument in support of the contention. was that upon the admitted facts, the finding must be that the defendant was a tenant from year to year and as due notice to quit had been given, the tenancy had been determined before the date of the action and the defendant ought to have been ejected.4. section 106 of the transfer of property act to which refenence was made on behalf of the plaintiff; does not apply to the case. if however, there was a similarity between the relation of the landlord. and tenant in england and that subsisting here between the plaintiff and the defendant, the english rule embodied in that section, that a general occupation is an occupation from year to year would go far to support the contention for the plaintiff. but .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1877)ILR1Bom208
warden and gibbs, jj.1. the court consider that the assistant judge was in error in holding that a mirasdar cannot oust a tenant who has been put in possession by a collector (vide salu v. ravji 1 bom. h.c. rep. 41). not only has this court decided to the above effect, but it has also held that a mirasdar who has given in a razinama has the right to recover his land if he sues within the period of limitation, unless in that document it is expressly stipulated that he has abandoned his miras right. the decree of the assistant judge is reversed and the case remanded for re-trial on its merits.2. the court reverses the decree of the acting assistant judge, dated 4th of march 1868 and remands the cause for re-trial with reference to the above judgment. costs to follow final decision.Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1898)8MLJ205
1. in a case like this a second order or order absolute, on application by the mortgagee was imperative under the transfer of property act to enable the plaintiff to obtain possession of the property. on such an application being made by the mortgagee, the mortgagor (defendant) is entitled under the proviso to section 87 of the act to obtain an extension of time for payment of the money on showing good cause. we cannot agree with the appellant's contention before us that the mortgagor cannot apply for such extension after the expiry of the time fixed for payment in the first order inasmuch as the mortgagee himself could apply for an. order absolute only after the expiry of such time. it is next contended by the appellant that even if the mortgagor could ask for an extension after the expiry of the time fixed for payment in the first order, he could not do so after the passing of the final order, and that such final order was in fact passed in the present case. ..that order was, however, passed without notice to the mortgagor (defendant) who, therefore, had no opportunity of availing himself of the provision made for his benefit in the latter part of section 87, by showing cause and obtaining an extension of time before the final order was passed and we think that as the mortgagor, as soon as he became aware of the ex parte order, applied to have it set aside and the order was thereupon set aside, it was competent to the court to extend the time for payment.2. the order of the .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 44Ind.Cas.930
barnes peacock, c.j.1. it is always a most unpleasant duty for a judge to be compelled to vindicate his own honour, or the dignity of the court over which he presides, by adopting measures which may cause pain, or wound the feelings of any man. bat a judge who would shrink from the discharge of what he considers to be his public duty, merely because it is to him a painful one, is not fit to be entrusted with the office which he holds. to me the duty which i am now called upon to perform is all the more painful, because the gentleman whose conduct is called into question is one with whom in times gone by i have held social and friendly intercourse. the case is one of public importance, and i am anxious that there shall be no misunderstanding of the views and opinions of the judges and of the reasons which induced them to adopt the course which they have pursued. above all, i am desirous that there shall be no further misrepresentations such as those with which unhappily we are called upon to deal. i have, therefore; thought it right to enter fully into the facts and law of the case, and i have reduced into' writing the greater portion of my judgment.2. mr. w. tayler was formerly a member of the bengal civil service. after his retirement he was admitted as a vakeel of the late sudder court; and upon the amalgamation of the late supreme and sadder courts, he, in common with all the vakeels of the late sudder court, was enrolled as a vakeel of the high court. he subsequently .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 45Ind.Cas.113
barnes peacock, c.j.1. an advertisement publislied in a newspaper for a demonstration against a judge for acts done in court may be a contempt of court as well as defamation, although it cannot be said that in every case a demonstration got up in order to obtain an expression of public opinion concerning the acts of a judge would bo a contempt, [p. 125, col. 1.]2. if anonymous letters are sent to the press containing false statements), the press is responsible for them if the name of the author is not given up. [p. 144, col. 2.]3. to say that a sentence is 'cruel' may be a con-tempt of court, though it would be no contempt if the remark is merely that, the sentence is a severe one. [p. 142, col 2; p. 143, col. 1.]4. per macpherson, j.--the high court has power to proceed by way of contempt oven when the contempt is not committed in court or during the pendency of a suit. [p. 145, col. 2.]5. per curiam.--the fact of his making an apology does not entitle the person charged with contempt of court to hisdischarge as a matter of right, [p. 137, col. 1.]6. charges of contempt against the printer and publisher of the englishman, calcutta. upon this case being called on--7. mr. kennedy stated that he appeared for mr. banks, printer of the englishman, with mr. evans and mr. paul. there was one point in which a little difficulty had occurred with res-peot to the form in which the affidavit of mr. banks was to be drawn up. it was stated that the court was sitting in its original .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1972)1MLJ141
n. krishnaswamy reddy, j.1. defendants 1 to 3 are the appellants. the plaintiff, the younger brother of the first defendant, filed the suit in forma pauperis for partition of his half share in schedules a,b,g mentioned in the plaint and for rendition of accounts of joint family business of soda and cigar factories. the learned subordinate judge passed a preliminary decree for partition of items 1 and 3 of a schedule properties into two equal shares and to allow one such share to the plaintiff and for a division of items 6 to 8 and 16 to 18 of the moveable c schedule properties. under the preliminary decree, the plaintiff was made liable to pay a moiety of the debt due under exhibit b-8. the suit was dismissed in other respects. the plaintiff filed a memo, of cross-objections.2. defendants 2 and 3 are the minor sons of the first defendant, the brother of the plaintiff, and the fourth defendant is the wife of the first defendant. the case of the plaintiff is that he and his brother, the first defendant were members of a joint family. their father vaithilinga padayachi, who died, during his life time, purchased item 2 of the a schedule properties bearing door no. 12, angalamman koil street, in 1924. vaithilinga started a cigar company in or about 1932 with the trade mark kuttiman and paladi in the name of the plaintiff as sundaram and company. the trade went on till 1948. vaithilinga also started a soda factory in or about 1940 and was carrying on the business till his death. .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1879)ILR4Cal551
mitter, j.1. the question raised in this special appeal is whether, according to hindu law, an unchaste mother is entitled to succeed to the properties of a deceased son, it being established that she became unchaste before the succession opened out to her?2. the district judge in the lower appellate court has answered this question in the affirmative. in this opinion we do not concur. the district judge relies upon a full bench decision of the allahabad high court--musamat ganga jati v. ghasita i.l.r., 1 all., 46. he is also of opinion, upon the authority of the judgments of mr. justice markby and the chief justice sir barnes peacock in the case of matangini debi v. joykali debi 5 b.l.r., 466, that act xxi of 1850 removed the bar to the succession of an unchaste woman arising from loss of caste.3. the question raised in the case before the allahabad high court was different. it was whether unchastity in a woman does not incapacitate her from inheriting any stridhan property? and the court held that it did not. but the lower appellate court relies upon a portion of the judgment of the officiating chief justice, in which he says that he was a party to a decision holding' that want of chastity in a mother does not defeat her right of inheritance.' the case referred to is musamat deokee v. sookhdeo 2 n.w.p.h.c. rep. 361. the decision in that case is, that a mother, who has already inherited from her son an estate, is not divested of it by reason of her subsequent unchastity. the .....Tag this Judgment!
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 30Ind.Cas.567
order1. we think the passage in our judgment, as to the exclusion of amrita under the hindu law, there seems to be no ground for that, because although a widow at the time of her father's death still she could certainly, as the law now stands, remarry and have issue', should be struck out but we do not think it necessary to alter the decree.Tag this Judgment!
Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1877)ILR1Bom538
kemball, j.1. the suit in this case was instituted in the court of the 2nd class subordinate judge of ahmedabad to obtain a decree declaratory of the right of the plaintiff to inherit the property of one bai adat, widow of kirparam veniram; the claim was valued at rs. 99, and the plaint was written upon a stamped paper of the value of rs. 10. the defendant denied the plaintiff's title and claimed to be himself the heir, and the subordinate judge found upon the merits that the plaintiff and defendant were co-heirs. against this decision both parties appealed to the district court, when the assistant judge, who heard the appeal, finding that the property left by the deceased exceeded in value rs. 5,000, held that the court of the subordinate judge, 2nd class, had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and on this preliminary objection reversed the decree of the subordinate judge, and threw out the plaintiff's claim with all costs. the plaintiff now comes to this court on special appeal asking to have the ruling of the assistant judge set aside and a judgment passed upon the cause.2. the question is, was the assistant judge wrong in holding that the court of a subordinate judge of the 2nd class was not competent to try the suit3. by section 24 of the bombay civil courts act (xiv of 1869), the jurisdiction of a subordinate judge of the 2nd class is declared to extend 'to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature wherein the subject-matter does not exceed in amount or .....Tag this Judgment!